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ABSTRACT 
 After the Global War on Terrorism, the world entered a multipolar system of 
power distribution due to the resurgence of Russia and the rise of China. In this new 
system, Asia is at the center of the strategic competition between the three great powers. 
The United States desires allies in the region that are capable of supporting its global 
strategy; this desire has caused Washington to become increasingly dissatisfied with 
Islamabad—a historical ally since the Cold War—which has proven unwilling to support 
the United States in achieving its objectives. This dynamic explains Washington’s current 
desire to make India its preferred partner in the region. As the United States grows closer 
with India, the future of the United States’ relationship with Pakistan is becoming 
unclear. Therefore, Pakistan has searched for more reliable partners, creating uncertainty 
among experts, who are divided on how Pakistan will be situated among the great powers 
in this multipolar system. By examining Pakistan’s past behavior during the Cold War 
(bipolar power distribution), the Global War on Terrorism (unipolar power distribution), 
and the present situation (multipolar power distribution), this research concludes that 
Pakistan will most likely balance the great powers against one another to maximize the 
benefits it receives to meet its own strategic goals. 
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The world has entered a new era of great power competition (GPC) as U.S. 
hegemony and the liberal world order are challenged by the resurgence of Russia and the 
rapid rise of China. The emergence of these two great powers produced a shift in the system 
of power distribution from the unipolar to a multipolar world. The United States officially 
recognized the return of GPC with the Trump administration’s release of its National 
Security Strategy (NSS) at the end of 2017. Policymakers and scholars have argued that 
Asia will be the focus of this emerging competition.1 Since the Obama administration, U.S. 
policymakers have argued that the United States would have to move past the era of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and “pivot” its foreign policy to focus on Asia as a 
means to remain globally competitive.2 According to Oriana Skylar Mastro, a senior 
political scientist at the RAND Corporation, unlike in the previous eras of GPC, which 
focused on control of Europe, dominance as a great power is now based on influencing and 
extending power to control over Asia.3  
As Asia becomes the center of the new multipolar world, the importance of South 
Asia has increased in part due to the United States’ desire to form a strategic partnership 
with India. The strengthening of Indo-U.S. relations is likely to impact the United States’ 
long historical relationship with Pakistan, India’s rival, which faces multiple points of 
tensions. First, the United States’ need for a strong partnership with Pakistan declined due 
to its post-GWOT strategic outlook and the conclusion of U.S. military operations in 
Afghanistan.4 Second, as its strategic importance to the United States has diminished, the 
Pakistani government’s handling of U.S. foreign aid and Pakistan’s provision of safe 
havens to terrorist organizations have amplified the United States’ dissatisfaction with 
                                                 
1 See, for example: “Defense 2020: Great Power Competition,” Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, January 15, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/great-power-competition. 
2 Financial Times, “Obama’s Pivot to Asia Remains Unfinished,” May 25, 2016, ProQuest. 
3 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Defense 2020: Great Power Competition.” 
4 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
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Pakistan.5 Lastly, the Pakistani government has felt increasingly threatened by the United 
States’ desire to grow a stronger relationship with India, a relationship it believes 
compromises Pakistan’s security.6  
The weakening of U.S.-Pakistani relations creates an opening for other states to 
form or further their own relationships with Pakistan, leaving the future of Pakistan in the 
new GPC setting unclear. Several scholars state that India would be the best partner in the 
region for the United States: India’s similar democratic values make it a good partner to 
compete with Russia, and because India desires parity with China in the India Ocean 
Region (IOR), India and the United States have a mutual strategic goal in the GPC against 
China.7 The recent strengthening of Indo-U.S. relations pushes China further away from 
India and has left Russia uncertain of its relationship with this former ally, creating the 
potential for Russia and China to look to Pakistan to balance the growing U.S. presence in 
Asia. Pakistan has had prior interactions with all three great powers and continues to 
interact with them in the emerging multipolar world.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
This history, along with Pakistan’s continued need for stability, poses the question 
of how Pakistan’s relationship with great powers will play out in the future. To provide 
further insight into this important issue, this research investigates the following questions: 
• How has Pakistan historically been situated in the strategic goals of great 
power states? 
• How has Pakistan leveraged great powers to address its stability concerns? 
                                                 
5 The Future of U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, House 
of Representatives, 114th Cong. 1 (2015), 1–2, https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2015/12/future-us-pakistan-
relations. 
6 Moeed Yusuf, “U.S.-Pakistan Relations,” February 14, 2018, in On Peace, produced by United Stats 
Institute of Peace, podcast, iTunes, 8:34, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/02/moeed-yusuf-us-
pakistan-relations. 
7 Suzelle M. Thomas, “India’s Grand Strategy: Ambitions and Capacity” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2019), 1, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62755. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Current literature suggests that whether great powers desire to partner or compete 
with India in the emerging multipolar system, India is at the center of great power alliance 
formation in Asia. By comparison, the literature pays inadequate attention to Pakistan’s 
strategic placement, as a nuclear power and the nemesis of India, in the complex system of 
Asia as a whole. Most experts currently focus on how great powers’ interactions with India 
have affected their relationships with Pakistan on an individual level, but few take into 
consideration the wider role Pakistan plays in the competition among great powers. This 
research fills that gap by investigating Pakistan’s role as an object of and an active 
participant in GPC. 
For the first time since the end of the Second World War, the United States is 
competing in a multipolar international system; this is also an uncharted territory for 
Pakistan, which gained its independence in 1947, as well as for the world’s strategic 
environment. The character of the polarity of GPC might dictate the dynamics of the 
behavior of small states like Pakistan. This research thus contributes to a deeper 
understanding of how great and non–great power states form alliances in the new system 
of multipolar power distribution and specifically why Pakistan has pursued relationships 
with great powers. First, understanding how great powers and non–great power states form 
alliances in system of various polarities provides insight into the emerging debate about 
future relationships in the new multipolar GPC. Secondly, an understanding of how 
Pakistan has pursued relations with great powers in the past gives insight into small states’ 
impetus to form alliances with great powers, specifically with those powers that are 
concerned about aid dependency and/or instability of developing states. Finally, how 
Pakistan will be situated in the new GPC and how Pakistan has leveraged its instability 
concerns will influence U.S. foreign policy in South Asia as it competes in GPC. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Answering the question of how Pakistan has historically been situated in the 
strategic goals of great powers and how it has leveraged great powers to address its stability 
concerns requires drawing upon literature that addresses the processes and means by which 
4 
great powers and Pakistan have formed relationships. This section first draws upon theories 
on the interaction between great and small (non–great power) states to explain why 
Pakistan has historically behaved in certain ways—specifically, why Pakistan has balanced 
against competing powers rather than bandwagon with the regional hegemon, India. The 
second section describes how instability in Pakistan affects its relationships with great 
powers, which is critical to understanding why, and in what manner, Pakistan seeks support 
from these states to address its instability concerns. 
1. Interaction between Great Power and Non–Great Power States 
According to scholars within most international relations circles, small states will 
choose between two fundamental actions when they face competing powers: either they 
will cede their sovereignty to bandwagon with competing powers or they will protect their 
sovereignty by forming alliances, most often with great powers, to balance against 
competing powers.8 While experts disagree about which action better fulfills smalls states’ 
strategic interests, most argue that because countries wish to maximize their autonomy and 
protect their sovereignty, they are more likely to balance. Stephen Walt, a leading scholar 
in the realist school, agrees that states generally prefer (and that it is more common) to 
balance than bandwagon because they are able to gain more leverage by balancing 
dominant competing states than by ceding to their hegemony.9 He explains that hegemons 
and competing powers scare smaller states by forcing them to “join alliances [to] avoid 
domination by stronger powers.”10  
Some experts, however, believe that states prefer to bandwagon. Robert S. Ross 
argues that small states “tend to [bandwagon] rather than balance [against rising] powers” 
because small states are “sensitive to local variation” in the capabilities of nearby rising 
powers.11 Critics of bandwagoning argue that the minority of states choose to do so only 
                                                 
8 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no. 4 (1985). 
9 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 5. 
10 Walt, 5. 
11 Robert S. Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing 
in East Asia,” Security Studies 15, no. 3 (2006): 355, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410601028206. 
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because they have no other options.12 Walt does agree that bandwagoning makes sense 
under these conditions, because he believes that small states cannot afford to be left 
vulnerable but likely have nothing meaningful to contribute in a balancing alliance.13 Only 
in later work does Walt concede that bandwagoning may be preferable to balancing, but 
only when the decision is based solely on conditions of war and peace. He derives this 
conclusion from Winston Churchill, who first stated that while balancing is favorable 
during peacetime, states prefer to bandwagon during times of war.14 Churchill’s belief is 
premised on the fact that smaller states wish to “share the fruits of victory” achieved 
primarily by great power states.15 Schweller agrees with this view in that states choose to 
bandwagon because they want to share these spoils.16 
Scholars argue that due to the historic rivalry and tension between Pakistan and 
India, Pakistan has chosen to balance India’s hegemony in South Asia by partnering with 
great powers to receive essential resources and support. Sumit Ganguly, Robert McMahon, 
and Andrew Small all illustrate how, since its history following partition, Pakistan has 
chosen to balance India to satisfy its internal and external security needs through its 
partnership with great powers.17 Sumit Ganguly and Feroz Hasaan Khan disregard the 
possibility that Pakistan has ever considered bandwagoning by describing the extreme 
lengths to which it has gone to resist bandwagoning with India.18 Munir Akram believes 
that even the idea that Pakistan would have or might bandwagon with India is farfetched 
because such behavior would directly contradict the “very raison d’être for the creation of 
                                                 
12 Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 17. 
13 Walt, 17. 
14 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1987), 21. 
15 Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 21. 
16 Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” 
International Security 19, no. 1 (1994): 82. 
17 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 10; Robert J. 
McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994), 3–10; Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics (London: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 1–25. 
18 Ganguly, Conflict Unending; Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani 
Bomb. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
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Pakistan” as a separate homeland for South Asian Muslims in the partition of British 
India.19  
Since its founding over 70 years ago, Pakistan scholars have shown that the country 
has actively taken measures to restrict India’s ability to dominate the region. Feroz Hasaan 
Khan concludes that this desire led Pakistan to go as far as to devote a majority of its 
resources and effort to develop a nuclear weapon as a deterrent to India.20 With the 
understanding that Pakistan has chosen to balance against India, the literature suggest that 
this behavior can be expected to continue in the new emerging multipolar competition. 
2. Pakistan’s Past and Potential Alliance Formation with Great Powers 
While there are undoubtably many variables that contribute to how Pakistan has 
formed alliances with great powers, most scholars agree that Pakistan’s instability has been 
the primary driver of its efforts to obtain support from great powers in previous systems of 
power distribution and that a similar trend exists in the emerging multipolar system. Ian 
Talbot states that internal and external issues in Pakistan’s relatively short history can best 
be described as a “fruitless search for stability,” which has contributed to its insecurity 
complex.21 Khan summarizes that this insecurity has cemented Pakistan’s alliances with 
great powers,22 stating that this dependence on great powers has placed Pakistan in a never-
ending cycle of instability.  
Although written primarily for a U.S. audience, Hilary Synnott argues that 
Pakistan’s complex and troubled history is relevant to all great powers and should be taken 
into consideration when great power states develop their strategies for partnering with 
Pakistan.23 Indeed, some literature does support the idea that Pakistan promotes its 
                                                 
19 Munir Akram, “Pakistan & Sino-US Cold War,” DAWN, June 9, 2019, https://www.dawn.com/
news/1487040/pakistan-sino-us-cold-war.  
20 Khan, Eating Grass, 71. 
21 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 4. 
22 Khan, Eating Grass, 23. 
23 Hilary Synnott, Transforming Pakistan: Ways out of Instability, Adelphi 406 (London: The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009). 
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economic, political, and military insecurities when soliciting partnerships with great 
powers.  
Pakistan’s instability has played a prominent role in the development of U.S.-
Pakistani relations. Robert McMahon explains how this alliance formed, specifically 
through the lens of the Cold War, because Pakistan needed support from the United States 
to recover from three wars with India early in its history.24 Hussain examines how 
Pakistan’s complex relationship with the United States around the time of GWOT created 
challenges for the relationship between both states; however, he suggests that providing 
Pakistan with U.S. foreign aid and eliminating sanctions addressed Pakistan’s instability 
concerns and were the foundation of Pakistan’s alliance with the United States during the 
unipolar system of power distribution.25 
As the United States has moved past GWOT and its involvement in Afghanistan, 
experts believe that the relations between the United States and Pakistan have soured, 
raising questions about the future of their partnership. Scholars such as Moeed Yusuf 
believe that the mutual distrust between the United States and Pakistan has escalated 
tensions, causing both countries to act more inimically towards each other.26 More 
optimistic experts, such as Salman Bashir, believe that if steps are taken to address the 
differences between Pakistan and the United States, it could operationalize a new 
framework for U.S.-Pakistani relations.27 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi believes that 
Pakistan will always remain a vital ally of the United States in the region due to its unique 
geographic location and the cultural bridge it can provide for Western states.28 However, 
                                                 
24 McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery. 
25 Touqir Hussain, U.S.-Pakistan Engagement: The War on Terrorism and Beyond, Special Report 
145 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005),  http://hdl.handle.net/2027/
pur1.32754077529208. 
26 Yusuf, “U.S.-Pakistan Relations.” 
27 Salman Bashir, “The Way Forward for Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Pakistani Perspective,” Pakistan 
Policy Symposium: Wilson Center Asia Program, February 21, 2019, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/
publication/the-way-forward-for-pakistan-us-relations-pakistani-perspective. 
28 Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, “An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron: Shift in the 
Pakistan-US Relations during the ‘War on Terror,’” Journal of Political Science 18, no. 2 (2011): 72, 
ProQuest. 
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Soherwordi asserts that the relationship between the two will transform into a partnership 
that will evolve on a conditional basis; whenever issues of its national interest arise and the 
United States and Pakistan are not cooperating based on clear mutual interests, Pakistan 
will take the opportunity to diverge from and perhaps oppose the United States. Literature 
on U.S.-Pakistani relations come up short on providing an in-depth analysis on the 
implications of Russia’s growing influence in the region as the literature currently tends to 
focus on how the U.S.-Pakistani relationship is affected by China’s actions in the region. 
Current literature on the effects of Russia’s quest in GPC on U.S. foreign policy tends to 
focus on the West and in Europe.  
With the potential weakening of U.S.-Pakistani relations, Pakistan appears to seek 
other partners to rely on, such as Russia and/or China. According to Andrew Small, not 
only has China been a historic partner of Pakistan since 1947, but, since the Trump 
administration froze U.S. military assistance to Pakistan, China has been strategically 
positioned to become a more reliable partner to Pakistan than the United States, especially 
as Pakistan seeks an alternative source for military and weapons procurement.29 Minhas 
Majeed Khan and Mirwais Kasi not only acknowledge that the Sino-Pakistani relationship 
is “time-tested, multi-dimensional, and unique,”  but also argue that, unlike Pakistan’s 
relationship with the United States, the Sino-Pakistani relationship may be stronger, or at 
least more stable, as the relationship has “sustained the shifts in regional and international 
politics [and] remained unaffected [by the various] changes of governments and 
leaderships in both countries.”30 
The Sino-Pakistani relationship has maintained its stability in part because of 
China’s disdain for India since the 1962 war between these countries and continues now as 
China desires parity with India in the IOR. However, Sino-Pakistani relations are not 
limited to this commonality. Umbreen Javaid believes that in the future, the “Afghanistan 
conundrum” will provide another basis for their relationship to grow: he states that China 
                                                 
29 Small, The China-Pakistan Axis, 1–7; Nivedita Kapoor, “Russia-Pakistan relations and its impact 
on India,” Rasina Debates (blog), Observer Research Foundation, July 3, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/
expert-speak/russia-pakistan-relations-impact-india-52715/. 
30 Minhas Khan and Mirwais Kasi, “Pakistan–China Relations: Developments in Economic and 
Security Areas in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies 37, no. 3 (Autumn 2017): 74, ProQuest. 
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will continue to provide resources to help stabilize Pakistan because Beijing needs its help 
to prevent the Taliban and other extremist groups from creating internal instability in China 
by supporting Chinese Muslim separatist groups.31 Similar to the literature regarding U.S.-
Pakistani relations, the literature pertaining to Sino-Pakistani relations does not analyze in 
depth the implications of Russia’s growing influence in Pakistan in the context of the 
emerging GPC. 
Although Pakistan does not have a history of a strong relationship with Russia, 
some recent literature claims that Russia may potentially meet Pakistan’s need resulting 
from its instability should the uncertainty in U.S.-Pakistani relations continue. Literature 
on this topic is limited; nevertheless, the arguments presented by scholars for this 
relationship are just as convincing as those for the relationship between Pakistan and other 
great powers. Almas Haider Naqvi and Yasir Masood point out that neither country has 
had a single bilateral dispute, and the tensions in their relationship were a product of each 
state acting “against each other to damage” the other’s interest indirectly in “the pursuit of 
[each’s] geopolitical goals and security imperatives.”32 They acknowledge that despite 
Russia not having a clear strategy in the region, there are several areas today in which 
Russia and Pakistan can find common ground, leaving the opportunity available for 
Pakistan to benefit from yet another great power alliance it previously did not have. Vinay 
Kaura disagrees only in that he believes Russia does have a significant strategy, which 
gives Pakistan greater influence in the formation of the potential alliance.33 Sarah Akram 
is also optimistic that a bilateral relationship can form between the countries due to the 
proactive actions each state has taken thus far. Each state, she says, recognizes the potential 
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for economic and political cooperation, and specifically Pakistan, which can benefit in the 
energy domain.34 
Tahir Amin writes that, unlike in the case of China, it is still uncertain how 
Afghanistan and the end of GWOT affects whether Pakistan can use the opportunity to 
extract more resources from its relationship with Russia. Nevertheless, he does argue that 
this dynamic could lead to a “potential convergence of interests” between Pakistan and 
Russia “in terms of [Russia’s desire to build] a defense capacity around Afghanistan so as 
to prevent the spreading of unrest” to surrounding areas, specifically Russia’s borders.35  
Some scholars suggest that Russo-Pakistani relations will flourish due to the 
decline in strength of Indo-Russo relations. Kaura recognizes this as both Russia and India 
appear to be heading in different directions, which is the basis of his argument as to why 
Russia wants Pakistan to yield greater influence in the region.36 Naqvi and Masood also 
agree as they conclude that India’s “tilt toward the U.S. and the West” has caused the 
Russo-Pakistani alliance to recently form.37 However, experts believe that Russia does 
prefer a relationship with India, if given the opportunity, should the emerging Indo-U.S. 
partnership diminish. They suggest that despite Russia’s growing distrust of India, its true 
desire remains to partner with India once again because it wants to take advantage of its 
economic growth.38  
Other than this dynamic, the most likely obstacle to a fruitful partnership between 
both states is the distrust between Moscow and Islamabad due to their historical 
relationship. Amin states that the progression of Russo-Pakistani relations are modest at 
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best, compared to how other relations in the region have changed.39 He explains that the 
“problematic legacy of their most hostile relationship with each other…continues to cast 
its shadow” on the future of this relationship because Pakistan appears to be reluctant to 
commit to Russia as a partner so long as Russia supports India.40 
As this review has shown, there is ample literature that describes Pakistan’s 
relationship with great powers; however, current literature lacks sufficient insight on the 
implication of these dynamics and leaves unexplored the implication of a multipolar 
context on Pakistan as great powers compete in Asia.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
It is conceivable that, given Pakistan’s uncertain relationship with the United States 
and its historical reliance on  great power partnerships to resolve its economic, political, 
and security concerns, Pakistan might favor a relationship with China and/or Russia.41 In 
the multipolar world, the nature of this GPC polarity will determine how Pakistan responds 
to the new global order and how it will forge its relationship with great powers to ensure 
its survival. Previous literature suggests that Pakistan has chosen to balance its insecurities 
with great powers in past systems rather than bandwagon with India due to the historical 
tensions between the states, which have largely shaped Pakistani foreign policy. Because 
of the uncertainty of the multipolar world, Pakistan remains strategically insecure, so the 
question this thesis answers is: how will Pakistan balance with great powers in the 
multipolar system of power distribution?  
This research examines three possible outcomes of Pakistan’s approach to 
balancing within the emerging three-power multipolar system. 
1. It will reestablish its strong relationship and partnership with the United 
States to balance Russia’s resurgence and China’s rise in South Asia. 
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Pakistan’s relationship with the United States could tighten as it continues 
to interact with other great powers due to its historical on again–off again 
relationship with the United States. 
2. It will balance the United States by forming a stronger partnership with 
Russia and/or China. As the United States continues to deepen its 
relationship with India, and as India’s relationship with Russia 
deteriorates, this thesis examines if a shift of alliances might occur, 
analyzing whether China and Russia are more suited to fulfill Pakistan’s 
security and stability needs in the new multipolar environment. 
3. Pakistan may circumstantially decide which great power state to balance 
with based on what it needs in order to maximize its potential gains, 
refusing to exclusively align itself to one great power over another. 
Pakistan might potentially take this action because each great power has 
historically played a complementary role in addressing Pakistan’s 
instability concerns. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design is based on a historical method, utilizing primary and 
secondary sources to account for the ways Pakistan has formed alliances in GPC under 
varying systems of polarity. It also examines the actions Pakistan is currently taking in the 
multipolar system. Books, news articles, government and think tank reports, and academic 
journals are the majority of the sources used, while this thesis also integrates firsthand 
accounts, government policy documents, official transcripts, and other work from political 
scientists that help provide an analytic perspective on the concepts discussed in this 
research.  
While there is abundant research that defines the elements that make a state a great 
power, for the purposes of this research, great power states are defined as the United States, 
China, and Russia, as outlined in President Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy.42 
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China and Russia are considered great powers because both countries have the capability 
to challenge to the United States economically, diplomatically, and militarily to influence 
and shape the current global order as each desires. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis is divided into five chapters, which show the evolving relationship 
between Pakistan and each of the three current great powers. The next two chapters are 
historical in nature: the second chapter examines Pakistan’s interactions with great powers 
during a bipolar system of GPC, and the third chapter examines Pakistan’s relationship 
with the United States (the sole global hegemon) in a unipolar system during GWOT. The 
fourth chapter examines Pakistan’s relationships with the United States, China, and Russia, 
in the context of the current global environment. The fifth and final chapter applies the 
findings from the previous chapters to test the hypotheses under the balance of power 
theory to examine how Pakistan will likely interact with great powers in the current 
multipolar system. Aside from accepting or rejecting each of the three hypotheses, the final 
chapter provides an analysis of the significance of the findings and the greater implications 
of each of the possible outcomes. In doing so, this research gives a more comprehensive 
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II. BIPOLAR SYSTEM OF POWER DISTRIBUTION: PAKISTAN 
IN THE COLD WAR 
Understanding how Pakistan has sought to satisfy its stability concerns and how 
Pakistan became an ally in fulfilling the strategic needs of great power states begins by 
understanding how Pakistan and great powers both were situated in the bipolar system of 
great power competition during the Cold War. From the end of the Second World War until 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the world was in a system of bipolar power 
distribution caused by the great power competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The tensions between the great powers also spread into South Asia, 
promoting an alliance between the United States and Pakistan. While the United States 
needed an ally in South Asia in close proximity to the Soviet Union, Pakistan needed an 
ally due to economic and political instability produced by the partition of British India and 
new state consolidation. 
This chapter provides an overview of Cold War politics and the goals of each 
superpower in a global context, which is necessary to understand how an alliance emerged 
between Pakistan and the United States. It also provides a timeline of both the United 
States’ and the Soviet Union’s interactions with South Asia to show how Pakistan 
geopolitically aligned with U.S. Cold War strategy. The next section discusses what caused 
the instability in Pakistan that led to an increase of tensions within South Asia to understand 
why Pakistan needed great powers to satisfy its security and stability dilemmas from the 
time it became a sovereign state in 1947 until 1991. Lastly, the chapter argues that the key 
takeaways of the bipolar system of power distribution produced during the Cold War are 
that the United States and Pakistan formed an alliance because the United States deemed 
South Asia strategic, the United States could not align simultaneously with both Pakistan 
and India, and the U.S.-Pakistani alliance was one of convenience and strategic necessity 
rather than mutual goals.  
16 
A. THE BIPOLAR WORLD AND SOUTH ASIAN ALLIANCES 
Competition between the United States and the Soviet Union started during and 
became prevalent towards the end of the Second World War in the 1940s.43 Thereafter, 
states that aligned with the United States became known as the Western Bloc, while those 
that aligned with the Soviet Union were referred to as the Eastern Bloc. Each superpower 
designed its foreign policy strategy to win the Cold War. For the United States, this policy 
was the doctrine of containment, which sought to contain the expansion of communism. 
Containment was first introduced in 1947 by diplomat George F. Kennan, who articulated 
the importance of preventing the spread of communism to ensure American prosperity and 
security.44 As for the Soviet Union, its foreign policy strategy was based on the concept of 
spreading and strengthening the position of socialism throughout the world.45 The two 
diametrically opposed strategies provided the framework for competition within a bipolar 
system of power distribution and future conflict between the two world superpowers. 
1. Significance of South Asia for Great Powers 
The Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union spilled 
into South Asia. At the onset of the Cold War, it became apparent that South Asia would 
play an important role in the global bipolar competition.46 According to McMahon, the 
subcontinent contained “one-fifth of the total world population on a land mass equal to that 
of Europe,”  and the region’s proximity to the Middle East and to the major sea routes that 
connected Europe to East Asia made it a strategic location.47  
For these reasons, preventing the Soviets from obtaining influence in South Asia 
quickly became a top priority for the United States, which sought to contain the expansion 
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of communism in the large, populated, and strategic subcontinent. McMahon says that U.S. 
policymakers were “convinced that the Soviet Union stood poised to capitalize [on] the 
political instability, economic distress, and social chaos” that was occurring throughout the 
world.48 He also states that U.S. intelligence agencies warned that unless the United States 
could “secure the goodwill of these newly liberated [countries, South Asian states might] 
become aligned with the U.S.S.R.”49 Indeed, at that time, the region was “particularly 
susceptible to Communist penetration”: a U.S. State, Army, Navy, Air Force Coordinating 
Committee position paper added that, without British oversight, both India and Pakistan 
faced a myriad of political and economic problems that created a vacuum of power 
regionally.50 Likewise, a National Security Council (NSC) position paper warned that 
communists’ penetration into South Asia could leave the United States and its allies 
vulnerable and without a “foothold on the Asian mainland.”51 Although these various 
reports and assessments made it clear that South Asia added strategic value to the United 
States’ foreign policy goal of containment, it was still unclear which country, India or 
Pakistan, would be willing to form an alliance with the United States and the Western Bloc.  
2. Difference Between India’s and Pakistan’s Cold War Foreign Policy 
Strategies   
The different approaches that India and Pakistan took towards the Cold War great 
powers brought about the alliance between the United States and Pakistan. While India 
declared neutrality, Pakistan quickly aligned itself with the Western Bloc. As the rise of 
the two superpowers became imminent, on September 7, 1946, in a national radio address, 
Indian Prime Minister (PM) Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed India’s foreign policy to be non-
alignment.52 Domestically, Nehru enjoyed popular support, and he did not want to alienate 
the Indian left by aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union.53 Nehru also 
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was seeking to separate India from foreign influences after years of colonial rule. Ayesha 
Jalal writes that India had the luxury of exercising this policy while Pakistan did not, due 
to the former’s greater military and economic strength.54 Because Pakistan could not 
sustain a non-aligned policy, it eagerly sought great-power partners to address its internal 
and external security concerns. The Soviet Union was not necessarily an option for the 
Jinnah, who was deeply opposed to the communist parties in India during the drive for 
independence.55 Zaidi states that Pakistan’s entry into the collective defense and military 
alliance organizations Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and Central Treaty 
Organization, founded to prevent further communist aggression in South Asia and the 
Middle East, respectively, solidified its position as a potential partner with the Western 
Bloc.56 
3. The United States’ Search for a South Asian Partner 
Despite initially trying to form an alliance with both India and Pakistan, the United 
States eventually found a South Asian partner in Pakistan because it did not trust India’s 
non-alignment policy and considered Pakistan to be strategically well-located. The United 
States initially faced little resistance from the Soviets for influence in South Asia, as the 
Soviets were also skeptical of both India and Pakistan due to both states’ ideological ties 
to the West, which were rooted in British imperialism.57 By the late 1940s, the Kremlin 
summarized this criticism and Soviet sentiment by stating that non-alignment policies were 
an “imperialist device [designed] to slander the U.S.S.R. by placing it on the same level 
with American imperialism.”58  As a result, the Soviets were cautious about South Asia 
countries, which initially left the United States as the sole great power seeking influence in 
the region. 
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The United States’ position in South Asia and its friendship with Pakistan was 
brought about by India’s non-alignment policy, which it considered as unacceptable.59 
McMahon claims that initially the United States was willing to work with India despite its 
non-alignment policy and avoided showing favoritism towards either India or Pakistan 
because it was unsure which county would be more useful to achieve its national security 
goals.60 He notes that India held a stronger appeal for the United States due to its natural 
resources, larger military, and prestige in the international arena, while the United States 
viewed Pakistan as a liability that was unlikely to significantly contribute to an alliance. 
Truman took initiatives to ensure both countries remained loyal to Western causes, and 
Kennedy provided special offers to support India’s development projects in hopes that 
India would abandon its non-alignment policy to more actively support Western causes. 
However, providing special offers proved unsuccessful as India was not responding to U.S. 
efforts to court it, because local disputes prevented India from abandoning its non-
alignment policy. The result of India’s decision caused the United States to focus on 
Pakistan as a closer ally. 
Pakistan’s strategic location also made the country a better fit for United States in 
achieving its Cold War objectives. Soherwordi states that because of Pakistan’s geographic 
location, it was more ideal for the containment strategies of both the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations because it could be used as a “pawn in the larger struggle” in 
the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.61 Additionally, McMahon explains that 
Pakistan’s strategic geographic location was significant enough to form an alliance, even 
considering Pakistan’s internal troubles.62 His reasoning focuses on the fact that Pakistan’s 
borders were closer to Soviet territory and were a desirable location for air bases and 
intelligence-gathering bases for military purposes. He also believes that Pakistan’s 
proximity to the Middle East was geopolitically significant due to the region’s oil fields 
and petroleum resources; Pakistan also possessed influence over Middle Eastern states as 
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the world’s largest Muslim nation.63 Pakistan’s strategic geographic location and 
discontent with India’s non-alignment policy shaped the United States’ decision to pursue 
a partnership with Pakistan in South Asia.  
4. Effects of the UNSC’s Involvement in Kashmir on Relations between 
South Asia and Great Powers 
The likelihood that the two South Asian states would each align with a great power 
increased when India referred the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) in 1948. Because the United States used the opportunity to solidify its alliance 
with Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict by supporting it diplomatically, it paved the way for 
the development of Indo-Soviet relations as India relaxed its non-alignment policy.  
On January 1, 1948, following the advice of British Governor-General Lord 
Mountbatten, India claimed that Pakistan was complicit in an act of aggression by arming 
Kashmiri rebels and attacking the princely state.64 The UNSC agreed to take up the matter 
based on Articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which both deal with 
“threats to international peace and security.”65 The viewpoints between Pakistan and India 
concerning Kashmir were so irreconcilable that little was accomplished after the first 
resolution other than the formation of a UN Commission. Meetings that followed merely 
issued relatively meaningless resolutions that included a series of poorly enforced cease-
fires and troop withdrawals.  
The failure of bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan empowered the 
superpowers to use their positions on the UNSC to create alliances. The Pakistani 
government began soliciting Western powers to take its side on the UNSC. Pakistani 
leaders appealed to Eisenhower administration officials in 1953, most notably Secretary 
Dulles,66 by promoting their willingness to support American priorities in the Cold War. 
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Throughout the 1950s, the United States was impressed with Pakistan’s promise of 
manpower and bases and with the Pakistani people themselves (in particular, their new 
leader, General Ayub Khan, who successfully led a coup d’état in 1958).67 The United 
States in return served as a surrogate for Pakistan diplomatically on the UNSC. Fewer than 
five months after Nehru and Bogra met, the Eisenhower administration announced that it 
would provide military assistance to Pakistan.68 Two months later, the United States and 
Pakistan signed a military pact.69 The United States would later rely on Pakistani military 
bases to conduct surveillance on the Soviet missile program: beginning in 1956, the U-2 
reconnaissance aircraft were launched from these bases, giving the U.S. the ability to 
collect intelligence on the Soviets.70 
As UNSC discussions progressed, India negatively perceived the favoritism among 
Western powers towards Pakistan. Various agreements and the relationship between the 
United States and Pakistan further politicized the Kashmir question in the UNSC. From 
India’s perspective, the UNSC was no longer a viable outlet to resolve regional issues. 
India’s perception of pro-Pakistani sentiment on the part of the United States increased 
diplomatic tensions between India and the West. Ganguly states that due to the partiality 
of the UNSC, India pushed back against the United States when PMs Nehru and Bogra met 
on August 20, 1953, to discuss the future plebiscite in Kashmir.71 He identifies that one of 
the informal agreements requested by India was that U.S. Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz be 
replaced as the UN-appointed plebiscite administrator. According to Ganguly, India feared 
that the Second World War hero possessed a pro-Pakistani bias, and India did not want him 
to be involved in the negotiations any further. Ganguly illustrates that India’s concerns 
were about more than the biases of one man, as Indian leaders believed Nimitz acted on 
behalf of the U.S. government at the UN.  
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The United States tried to suppress India’s fears by offering to sell it similar 
weapons that it offered Pakistan and by reassuring India that the military training and 
equipment provided to Pakistan would not be used by Pakistan against India.72 By this 
point, India viewed the United States negatively due its relationship with Pakistan, and the 
negotiations over the plebiscite deteriorated, further increasing tensions in the region. 
In response, the Soviet Union saw this as an opportunity, despite India’s non-
aligned status, and began to exercise its power on the UNSC to undermine the growing 
U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Nikita Khrushchev publicly declared that India possessed the 
rights to Kashmir, and the Soviets issued the first veto in the UNSC’s Kashmir debate when 
the council sought a resolution to demilitarize Kashmir and secure the state with UN 
forces.73 Ganguly reveals that later, during the 104th UNSC meeting over the Kashmir 
conflict, a Soviet veto practically ended the UNSC’s involvement in the dispute.74  
The politicization of the Kashmir conflict in the UNSC led to a failure to reach an 
agreement on the bilateral and multilateral levels. To counter the support Pakistan was 
receiving from the United States, India increasingly softened its non-alignment rhetoric 
and welcomed a partnership with the Soviet Union to remain competitive and to ensure its 
security. Elements within the United States government grew increasingly distrustful of 
India as its relationship with the Soviet Union flourished.  
B. COLD WAR AND U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS 
At the start of the 1960s, the United States increased its aid to Pakistan significantly 
because it needed Pakistan to support its Cold War efforts. This aid reached nearly $2 
billion, which would be the most given by the United States to Pakistan until after 9/11 
when it expanded its aid again.75 However, due to the Pakistani government’s aggression 
toward India in Kashmir in 1965, the United States significantly reduced Pakistan’s 
military and economic aid because it did not wish to “become entangled in an India-
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Pakistan conflict.”76 Not only the Johnson administration but the U.S. Congress also 
changed its attitude towards Pakistan and passed legislation suspending aid, infuriating 
then-Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.77 The cost of the Vietnam War, which was 
occurring during this time, also contributed to the Johnson administration’s strategic 
decision to suspend aid in order to save money. 
With the loss of U.S. aid, Pakistan reached out to China for economic and 
diplomatic support. Even though China was more understanding of Pakistan’s aid request 
and more willing to help than the United States due to its declining relationship with India, 
it did not actively help Pakistan secure Kashmir as Pakistan had originally hoped.78 
However, China did take a stronger stance against India on other issues. For example, 
China condemned India for displaying “criminal aggression” at the Tibetan border and 
issued its recent foe with an ultimatum to remove its military within a few days.79 
Regardless of Pakistan’s perception of China’s commitment, India was threatened enough 
by Chinese engagement in the region, especially after the 1962 war, that it sought security 
assurances from both the United States and the Soviet Union should China attack.80  
Frustrated with the growing situation in the region and still preoccupied with the 
Vietnam War, the United States backed off from playing a strong role in South Asia.81 The 
Soviet Union used the United States’ frustration as an opportunity to expand its influence 
in South Asia and build a stronger relationship with India. In 1966, the Soviets led 
negotiations between India and Pakistan at Tashkent,82 which “essentially returned the 
[Kashmir] situation back to the status quo.”83 A year later, the Soviet Union would seize 
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the opportunity to expand its relationship with India by signing a Treaty of Friendship after 
the Pakistanis denied the Soviets’ request to build a trade route through South Asia.84  
With the potential failure of U.S. containment policy in South Asia, the United 
States once again prioritized its partnership with Pakistan with the incoming favorable U.S. 
presidential administration of Richard Nixon in 1969.85 Feroz Khan states that with the 
election of Nixon, Pakistan would once again become a priority in the U.S. containment 
strategy.86 Margaret MacMillan explains that Pakistan was important to Nixon because it 
could serve as the intermediary for improving U.S. relations with China due to Yahya 
Khan’s close relationship with Beijing.87 She states that with Yahya Khan’s help, Nixon’s 
national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, was able to arrange the meeting between Nixon 
and Mao through China’s premier, Zhou Enlai. As part of his plan to normalize relations 
with China, Nixon supported Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War by sending the 
USS Enterprise task force to the Bay of Bengal to express to Beijing the United States’ 
commitment to its alliances.88 To express its dismay over the growing Sino-American 
relationship and to send a message of its support for India, the Soviets countered the U.S. 
naval fleet in the bay with its own naval forces.89  The growing Sino-American relationship 
made the Indo-Soviet relationship even more relevant because it served as a counterweight 
to the Soviet influence. 
Although the United States had serious disagreements with Pakistan during the 
Carter administration over Pakistan’s nuclear program, narcotics, and human rights 
violations, the administration saw past these differences to maintain its containment policy 
when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. First, expanding the U.S. 
relationship with Pakistan concerned the Carter administration because, since the 
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Eisenhower administration, the United States had maintained a policy of nuclear 
nonproliferation that included Pakistan.90 Secondly, Pakistan was a producer and 
consumer of opium, and, according to Baxter, one in every two hundred Pakistanis were 
heroin addicts.91 In addition to the health concerns and law enforcement problems, Baxter 
contends that the Carter administration was concerned that these drugs would find their 
way into the international drug trade. Lastly, specifically under Zia’s regime, Pakistan 
committed several violations of basic human rights by targeting women and the press and 
by implementing the rule of martial law.92 With the increase of Soviet encroachment again 
in South Asia, the U.S. government began to take the threat more seriously by providing 
Pakistan with resources and funding, which was used to help prevent communist 
progression.  
Despite President Jimmy Carter’s concerns with the Pakistani government, he 
reverted to previous U.S. Cold War ideology and placed Pakistan at the forefront of 
containment policy after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.93 In 
Carter’s 1980 State of the Union Address, he referred to Pakistan as a key state in 
containing Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and offered it aid and assistance to hinder 
Soviet progress.94 The Carter administration entertained the idea of providing clandestine 
support to the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), as it knew that the loss of Iran as an ally 
meant the United States relied on Pakistan as its partner in the region.95 Clandestine 
operations were favored by the Pakistani government because it believed these types of 
operations were more effective than conventional methods.96 The U.S. Congress also 
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looked past its concerns and waived the nuclear inspection requirement so that assistance 
packages could be delivered to Pakistan.97  
Correctly hedging his bets for a potentially more favorable Republican presidential 
administration in the future, Zia rejected Carter’s “peanuts” offer of $400 million in foreign 
aid. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan significantly worried Pakistan because it was 
surrounded by hostile neighbors, and it expected the regime of Afghan President Babrak 
Karmal to add to the hostility.98 In Afghanistan, communist factions gained traction, 
causing over a million Afghan Pashtuns to migrate into Pakistan.99 Pakistan grew 
concerned that migration might initiate ethnic calls for independence or threaten domestic 
instability, as Pakistan, too, had a large Pashtun population.100 Zia was particularly worried 
about secret operations the Soviets and Afghans were conducting in the Pakistani regions 
that opposed his rule, especially in the Bhutto family stronghold Sindh region.101 Even 
more worrisome for Pakistan, causing a rise in tensions with India, was that the pro-Soviet 
government in Afghanistan favored India and that many of those in PM Indira Gandhi’s 
government were becoming increasingly more pro-Soviet and disgruntled over the U.S.-
Pakistani partnership. In return for India agreeing to diplomatically support the Soviets’ 
action in Afghanistan, Gandhi expanded India’s relationship with the Soviet Union by 
orchestrating a massive weapons transfer for India.102  
With Reagan in office, Pakistan would resume receiving economic and military 
assistance, aid for the Afghan mujahidin,103 and the ability to work with a more tolerant 
U.S. administration that was willing to look past the actions of the military dictatorship in 
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Pakistan.104 Zia governed Pakistan with a tight leash, but his government was able to 
produce tangible results in helping the United States deter the Soviets in Afghanistan.105 
Unlike Carter’s “peanuts” offer, U.S. President Ronald Reagan offered Pakistan a 
$3.2 billion aid package.106 This package was for official and clandestine purposes: foreign 
assistance to increase the lethality of Pakistan’s military and measures designed to covertly 
support and arm the mujahidin, respectively. Coll notes that the package significantly 
increased the capabilities of the conventional Pakistani military.107 This included the 
authorization to sell Pakistan the F-16 jet, an offer that previously had been exclusively 
given to NATO members and Japan,108 and the Hawkeye EC-2 aircraft.109 The U.S. 
government also used the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to funnel money and 
resources to the mujahidin through the ISI.110 Supplying the mujahidin was just as 
important as providing military equipment to help stabilize Pakistan: multiple sources 
acknowledge the mujahidin’s contribution to not only helping keep the fight against the 
Soviets alive but also making the battle no longer worth fighting for the Soviets.  
C. INSTABILITY IN PAKISTAN DURING THE COLD WAR 
While the United States and the Soviet Union were competing for global influence 
in the Cold War, economic, political, and internal and external security issues caused 
instability in Pakistan, driving it to seek alliances with great powers. This section explains 
how the partition of British India led to an uneven distribution of economic resources, 
assets, and a strong military that undermined civilian institutions, causing Pakistan to rely 
on resources from great powers to mitigate its economic and political instability. Finally, 
the last section shows how internal insurgencies from dissident ethnic groups and 
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numerous military conflicts with India over the princely state of Kashmir caused instability 
in Pakistan, generating its need for military support and resources from great powers to 
deal with its internal and external security imperatives.  
1. Economic Instability in Pakistan between Partition and the End of the 
Cold War 
The partition left Pakistan economically disadvantaged because Pakistan received 
less infrastructure, industries, assets, and resources than India and it received a 
disproportionate amount of the public debt. These disadvantages caused it to rely on 
financial aid and support from great powers. According to Jalal, not only did Pakistan 
inherit actual material inequality in partition compared to India, it also incurred negative 
sentiments about the processes of partition, which led to further instability as it sought to 
equalize the partition. Ayesha Jalal states that the partition left Pakistan unstable because 
Pakistan felt the process and the result of partition was not fair or equal.111  
According to Jalal, Pakistan’s economic disadvantages were rooted in the division 
of resources and debt; Pakistan received only 17.5% of British India’s total financial assets 
in partition, which was insufficient to meet all its needs to establish a new sovereign state. 
Jalal adds that because Pakistan was the agrarian backwater of the British Empire, it lacked 
the industrial infrastructure necessary to develop a sustainable economy because it 
historically had received little attention with regards to development.112 Pakistan’s 
economic troubles derived from its need for money to “pay for the upkeep of its [defense] 
forces, build an administrative structure, [resettle] the millions fleeing into its territories 
[and to] set up a workable taxation structure and operational money market.”113 
In addition to not having enough assets, Pakistan felt that it carried a 
disproportionate amount of the public debt.114 Pakistani leaders argued that the percentage 
of public debt owed should have been representative of the past economic contributions of 
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the areas that now made up Pakistan during the colonial era.115 Jalal notes that based on 
this approach, Pakistan would only have been responsible for less than a tenth of the total 
financial liabilities resulting from partition.116 She explains that the Pakistani position 
caused conflict with India’s representatives because they disagreed, believing that the 
Pakistanis were grossly underestimating their share of the debt and that they overinflated 
the amount of assets to which they were entitled. Thus, not only did the fair-share debate 
leave Pakistan economically disadvantaged, but it also contributed to instability in the 
region as tensions increased between the two countries. 
Due to such disadvantages, Pakistan’s economic stability became dependent on 
foreign aid, particularly from the United States. The ebbs and flows of economic growth 
and prosperity in Pakistan are directly correlated to it receiving foreign aid. Together, 
Khanna and Zaidi show a correlation between foreign aid and Pakistan’s economic growth 
by explaining that the economy did extremely well throughout the 1960s when U.S. aid 
was abundant.117 During this period, Pakistan had high growth rates and the poverty level 
declined. Khanna highlights that during these decades, GDP grew by 6–7% per year and 
that trade excelled; in 1965, Pakistan’s exports exceeded those of “South Korea, Turkey 
and Indonesia” combined.118 Zaidi states that economic prosperity in Pakistan during both 
decades was tied to U.S. financial aid, which composed 5% of Pakistan’s GDP and was 
critical to the initial industrialization of the country by way of financing development 
projects.119 Later, however, as a result of a decline in U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1965, due to 
Pakistan’s aggression towards India, Pakistan faced economic decline.120  
In the years following partition, Pakistan’s economic stability faced further 
challenges as its economic policy constantly changed. Sushil Khanna argues that Pakistan’s 
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ineffective economic policy produced ebbs and flows of growth in the Pakistani economy 
throughout its early years.121 In 1971, the secession of East Pakistan122 had a detrimental 
impact on Pakistan’s ability to set effective fiscal policy because the loss of East Pakistan 
caused Pakistan to need to replace the internal markets it had lost and its primary source of 
export dollars.123 Khanna shows how Pakistan’s need for new markets caused it to desire 
state-run enterprises and influenced PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to enact populist economic 
policies. Bhutto’s policies included an increased emphasis on large-scale manufacturing 
and an industrialized public sector, and he promoted greater government control over the 
private sector.124 However, according to Khanna, although many of Bhutto’s economic 
policies would prove to be effective, the oil crisis of 1973 followed by the global economic 
recession demanded the implementation of new capitalist economic policies in Pakistan. 
The resulting decline of economic growth in the late 1970s contributed to General Zia-al-
Haq’s ability to consolidate power in 1977 after launching a military coup that overthrew 
Bhutto’s socialist democratic regime. Zia rallied against nationalization and received the 
support of the private sector.125 During his tenure, Pakistan experienced high growth rates 
of 6 to 7% and declining poverty.126 
These constant changes of economic policy prevented the policies from having the 
opportunity to produce positive effects. Khanna associates the completion of Bhutto’s 
national projects begun during the early 1970s to the increase in economic growth during 
the 1980s to show that, in fact, some of the economic policies were actually effective.127 
He states that during the 1980s, growth rose 6–7% per year and poverty declined, and he 
attributes Pakistan’s unprecedented agricultural growth to the national Indus Basin Tarbela 
Dam project completed in 1976. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s inability to achieve sustainable, 
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effective economic policy created its reliance on great powers for financial aid and 
resources.  
2. Political Instability in Pakistan between Partition and the End of the 
Cold War 
In the realm of political instability, Pakistan experienced three military coups 
against its civilian-led government, causing the need for the new military regimes to 
acquire resources from great powers to reduce its instability. Although there is a connection 
between economic instability and political instability, some political factors also played a 
role in destabilizing regimes in Pakistan. Some scholars claim that Pakistan’s political 
instability resulting from the military coups in 1958, 1969, and 1977 was a product of 
Pakistani civilian-led bureaucratic incompetence.128 However, the more precise way to 
explain the problems faced by the civilian authorities is to understand the institutional 
balances Pakistan inherited during the partition.  
According to Jalal, Pakistan’s military strength derives from the inheritance it 
received as a consequence of partition: after partition, Pakistan’s military strength was 
140,000 people, which included 30% of  British India’s army, 40% of its navy, and 20% 
of its air force.129  Jalal claims that Pakistan’s civilian institutions were by contrast 
relatively weak because the country lacked an administrative center, and various 
inconsistencies in the government administration created confusion and inefficiency after 
partition.130 Pakistan only received 121 civil servants, when Pakistani officials felt that a 
more reasonable amount would have been a minimum of 200 to start its administration 
after partition.131 
Some authors argue that the strength of Pakistan’s military also came from its 
historical relationship with the Western world. Cohen states that the military was a more 
competent institution than Pakistan civilian institutions because Western ideals had a 
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strong influence on Pakistan’s military due to its historical ties with Britain.132 He notes 
that the British helped develop a professional officer corps in Pakistan and that many 
Pakistani officers who fought for the British during the Second World War had previously 
attended the prestigious British military training school at Sandhurst. He maintains that 
Pakistani military leaders believed Great Britain to be the standard for successful military 
models and he asserts that Britain’s greatest contribution to Pakistan’s military strength 
was its “extensive military links with [other] countries,” which contributed to Pakistan’s 
relationship with the United States.133 However, Zaidi adds that the implication of the 
military links between the Pakistani and British militaries is that Pakistan’s military greatly 
benefited from U.S. foreign aid at the expense of development projects and weakening its 
civilian institution.134 He claims that the military’s greater competence arose from the fact 
that it received more aid from foreign powers than did the civilian governments, who ruled 
at the time of economic crisis and decline in foreign aid. 
There is no doubt, however, that civilian institutional failure strengthened the 
military further. C. Christine Fair argues this point by blaming civilian institutions for the 
continual growth of the military’s power since partition because the power was derived 
from society’s “acceptance of [the military] as a political arbiter, compounded with its 
prominent role as the guardian of the country’s security, sovereignty, and ideology.”135 
Fair explains that to obtain legitimacy and power, Pakistan’s political leadership and the 
civilian bureaucracy went out of their way to decrease democratic values, in favor of 
promoting further military control in order to get the military to back them. Furthermore, 
the Pakistani Supreme Court has not opposed the military leaders who have ascended to 
the presidency. Instead, the court has used the “doctrine of necessity” to legitimize the 
coups against Pakistan’s democratically elected government.136 Fair concludes that the 
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decision by civilian-led institutions to support the military has led to the creation of a 
national security state.  
The Pakistani military’s relative strength over its civilian institutions led to three 
successful coups during the Cold War when the military decided that it could run the 
country more competently and was not willing to give up power it inherited as part of the 
British empire. Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, and Muhammed Zia-al-Haq decided to suspend 
the constitution and institute martial law during their respective coups due to civilian moves 
to make the military subservient.137 Because of political instability, the military regimes 
then needed great powers to validate the coups, provide resources to keep up economic 
stability, and gain legitimacy. 
3. Internal and External Security Apparatus in Pakistan: 1947–1990 
During the Cold War, Pakistan’s internal and external security imperatives required 
it to seek great power support and resources. Internally, insurgencies from dissident 
domestic groups led to security concerns that created instability in Pakistan. Externally, 
military conflict with India over the state of Kashmir also led to security concerns that 
caused instability in Pakistan. Together, Pakistan’s need for financial and military 
resources to control domestic unrest enhanced its desire to seek willing and capable great-
power partners.  
Domestic uprisings created internal security concerns as they led to a rise of 
insurgencies and instability in Pakistan; this rise caused the state to expand its internal 
security to implement state-making processes in the early years. While Pakistan 
experienced an array of insurgencies during the Cold War, Adeel Khan suggests that the 
most prominent internal threat during the Cold War era was ethno-nationalism in 
Baluchistan.138 The Pakistani government launched armed operations in Baluchistan on 
four separate occasions between Pakistan’s creation and the end of the Cold War. The first 
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three operations occurred in 1947, 1958, and 1962, respectively.139 The fourth operation, 
from 1973 until 1977, indicates the severity of this insurgency; it required 80,000 Pakistani 
troops to quell over 55,000 Balochi insurgents.140 Khan’s findings state that the basis for 
the government’s actions against Baluchi insurgents were that local leaders and tribes 
rejected the government’s development projects aimed at stabilizing the country. By 
contrast, he emphasizes that the Balochi insurgents believed that the government, then 
controlled by the Punjabis, wanted to exploit Baluchistan’s vast resources and did not 
provide enough benefits to the locals. While causing political clashes, this issue was at the 
heart of stabilizing the country’s economy. In the 1970s, the Pashtun parties and radicals 
supported the Baluchi claims, leading to expansion of instability in the country and a crack-
down by the PM. To cope with this level of domestic unrest, Pakistan needed great power 
partners to provide military resources so its military could suppress the insurgents and 
financial support so that Pakistan did not have to rely on Baluchistan’s natural resources. 
When Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto in 1977, he was able to gain these resources. 
Likewise, conflict over Kashmir caused external instability as it led to rising tension 
between Pakistan and India. The reason for Pakistan’s attachment to Kashmir was that the 
princely state had a Muslim-majority population but a Hindu Maharaja.141 Although there 
was no consensus among Kashmiris for joining either India or Pakistan, some tribal 
Muslims in Kashmir revolted against the Maharaja because they supported accession to 
Pakistan. Ganguly states that in October 1947, the Pakistani Army armed the Muslim rebels 
in the southwestern Poonch region of Kashmir.142 He writes that because the Hindu 
Maharaja was threatened by Pakistani-backed forces and unable to defend himself, the 
Maharaja requested military assistance from PM Nehru in return for an agreement of 
accession to India. Along with the Maharaja, Sheikh Abdullah of the National Conference, 
a Kashmiri political party, signed the accession document under autonomy framework on 
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the condition that it would be revisited soon after war ended. The Indian army then moved 
in to prevent Pakistan’s attempt to take Kashmir. 
Pakistan made another failed attempt to annex Kashmir in 1965 when its military 
initiated an uprising in Kashmir because it believed that India was weak and vulnerable 
due to its losses in the Indo-China War of 1962.143 Ganguly points out that, after Pakistan’s 
two failed attempts, India used the same discrete and clandestine tactics that Pakistan had 
previously and unsuccessfully used to deliver Pakistan a catastrophic defeat in the 1971 
Indo-Pakistani War. He makes the case that all three of Pakistan’s wars against India only 
increased tensions between both countries and did little to relieve Pakistan’s fear of being 
able to deter Indian regional hegemony.144  
Some scholars believe that Islam connected Pakistan to Kashmir. Pakistan’s 
identity crisis arose because without Kashmir, the very reason for Pakistan’s existence as 
the homeland for South Asia’s Muslim population was compromised. Ganguly quotes 
Bhutto, who, as foreign minister, wrote that, “Pakistan is incomplete [territorially] and 
ideologically” without Kashmir.145 According to Cohen, Pakistan has faced an Islamic 
identity crisis since the partition. Although Jinnah sought to establish a secular state in 
1947, some Pakistani leaders were attracted to the idea of Pakistan as an Islamic 
country.146 Cohen provides multiple anecdotes of Pakistanis who acknowledged that they 
prioritized their Islamic faith above all else.147 He says that later, the Islamization 
movement in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s emerged to bridge the gap between 
the country’s majority Islamic faith and the rule of law under Zia’s leadership. He contends 
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that Pakistan’s shift towards non-secularism during this period legitimized Islam as a 
sustainable alternative to the Western secular models that Zia felt failed Pakistan in the 
past. This shift made finding powerful partners that could supply the resources Pakistan 
needed to obtain Kashmir even more critical as Pakistan revitalized its identity as an 
Islamic nation. Pakistan’s new identity only increased tensions in the Kashmiri conflict and 
led to instability in Pakistan. Pakistan’s need for support became more urgent than ever.  
According to Feroz Khan, the result of the three wars with India caused Pakistan to 
develop an inferiority complex, as it felt unable to challenge India conventionally and 
therefore believed it required great power partners to obtain the resources required to build 
nuclear weapons necessary to challenge India’s conventional defense superiority.148 As he 
states, subsequent to the loss to India in 1971, Pakistan adopted the sentiment of “never 
again” as it promised to not let another embarrassing military outcome occur in the 
future.149 Feroz Khan’s research shows that the inferiority complex solidified PM Bhutto’s 
hardline position that Pakistan should nuclearize to counter India, even if it meant that 
Pakistanis had “to eat grass” in order to survive.150 These wars strengthened Pakistan’s 
belief that it could not challenge India on its own and therefore would always need great-
power partners for resources and support. 
Nuclear weapon development in South Asia contributed to further internal 
instability as the Pakistani military strengthened its domestic position as it acquired more 
state resources. The defense budget took up more resources than the educational and other 
developmental budgets. Externally, more conflicts with India, such as the Brasstacks 
Exercises and the Siachen Conflict during the mid-1980s, occurred, increasing tensions 
and contributing to instability as Pakistan sought to fulfill its nuclear ambitions.151 
Because of a lack of resources, Pakistan was unable to nuclearize on its own; it required 
support from external powers to achieve its own nuclear aspirations 
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D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Cold War competition between the two global superpowers provided the incentive 
for great powers to interact and form alliances in South Asia, enabling Pakistan to be 
awarded the aid and resources it needed to address its instability concerns. The two South 
Asian states were of immense strategic value as the United States and the Soviet Union 
competed for influence in the region in pursuit of their greater Cold War strategies. This 
competition provided both India and Pakistan an opportunity to secure a great power 
partner capable of responding to each state’s respective security concerns. Although India 
remained a non-aligned state throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union backed India 
diplomatically and militarily in order to ensure balance in South Asia. 
There are three key takeaways from the dynamics between Pakistan and great 
powers within the context of the bi-polar system. First, the United States deemed South 
Asia a strategically significant region in the U.S. Cold War strategy of containment. Due 
to its geographical location, size, and instability created by partition, the region was 
susceptible to communist influence. To counter this influence, the United States actively 
sought partnerships in South Asia to contain Soviet influence. Second, the United States 
could not align and partner with both India and Pakistan. Although it tried, the United 
States’ goal to effectively leverage a meaningful relationship where both countries 
advanced the U.S. containment strategy was unattainable. This result was indicative of the 
immense animosity between India and Pakistan and showed that both India and Pakistan 
perceived the other’s great power partnership as a threat. Lastly, Pakistan’s relationship 
with the United States was based on convenience rather than shared mutual values and 
goals. The United States provided aid and resources to Pakistan when it had something to 
gain from the partnership because it did not want its containment policy to fail. The 
Americans supported Pakistan during military dictatorships and even turned a blind eye as 
Pakistan was developing its nuclear weapons program and abusing human rights because 
it was more concerned about using Pakistan to deter Soviet aggression in South Asia. 
Meanwhile, Pakistan needed a strong and a resourceful ally to secure itself against regional 
and internal threats. For these reasons, the United States and Pakistan formed an alliance 
during the Cold War.  
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III. UNIPOLAR SYSTEM OF POWER DISTRIBUTION: 
PAKISTAN IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Following the end of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
the world entered a unipolar system of power distribution with the United States as the sole 
world hegemon. In order to understand Pakistan’s position in the new emerging 
competition between great powers, it is important to understand why and how Pakistan and 
the United States again formed an alliance in the unipolar system. This chapter uncovers 
the relationship formed between Pakistan and the United States from the end of the Cold 
War, when the United States distanced itself from Pakistan, until 2017, when U.S. president 
Donald Trump announced the United States’ return to great power competition. 
Specifically, this chapter focuses on how the relationship between these two countries 
transitioned from post-Cold War distancing to extensive cooperation during the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT), when the United States used Pakistan to fulfill its strategic 
objectives and Pakistan needed the United States for support and resources to once again 
satisfy its stability concerns.  
To establish the context of the unipolar system after the end of the Cold War, this 
chapter begins by describing the global environment when the United States emerged as 
the world’s sole global hegemon. Then, it discusses how Pakistan was situated in the 
strategic goals of the United States’ counterterrorism plan during the GWOT. Next, the 
chapter describes the economic, political, and security challenges Pakistan faced that 
contributed to its instability and created its need to receive great power support between 
1991 and 2017. This chapter concludes that although Pakistan’s strong military institution 
made it a desirable partner for the United States to achieve its counterterrorism objectives, 
Pakistan undermined the United States by prioritizing its own strategic objectives. 
Furthermore, this chapter finds that Pakistan was willing to seek support from other 
partners in the absence of the United States, setting the stage for the emergence of the 
multipolar system of great power distribution. 
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A. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE UNIPOLAR WORLD AND 
ITS EFFECT ON U.S.-PAKISTANI RELATIONS  
In the beginning of the unipolar system of power distribution, U.S. foreign policy 
focused on expanding its liberal world order by building stronger ties with democracies 
and mending Cold War relationships. By the end of the unipolar system, U.S. foreign 
policy shifted its focus to counterterrorism. While the first Bush administration pushed 
Pakistan away, the Clinton administration went a step further and began irritating Pakistan 
by strengthening U.S. relations with Pakistan’s rival, India.152 After September 11th, the 
second Bush administration again turned to Pakistan to be a close ally and to help the 
United States achieve its counterterrorism goals. 
During the first Bush administration, as the Soviets ended its occupation of 
Afghanistan and as the Cold War was coming to an end, the United States suspended aid 
to Pakistan under the provisions of the Pressler Amendment, which prohibited the U.S. 
government from providing financial aid to Pakistan if the U.S. president could not 
annually certify that Pakistan was not enhancing its nuclear program.153 Most scholars 
agree that the United States suspended financial aid to Pakistan because the United States 
no longer needed Pakistan’s assistance. The United States had turned a blind eye to 
Pakistan’s nuclear developments during the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. However, 
after the Afghan-Soviet War, the United States refused to accept Pakistan’s nuclear 
program. Zaidi explains that, as result of the Pressler restrictions, U.S. aid to Pakistan “was 
almost negligible” and, in 1990, USAID closed its offices in Pakistan.154 Feroz Khan 
explains that along with suspending economic aid, the amendment froze $300 million of 
military supplies to Pakistan and prevented the continued sale of F-16s, which were crucial 
for Pakistan as a “reliable method of delivery” for its nuclear arsenal.155 According to a 
                                                 
152 Aparna Pande, “Natural Allies? The India-US Relations from the Clinton Administration to the 
Trump Era,” Aisie Visions no. 104 (December 2018): 10, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-
lifri/asie-visions/natural-allies-india-us-relations-clinton-. 
153 See, for more information on the Pressler Amendment: Khan, Eating Grass, 226, 235; Hussain, 
U.S.-Pakistan Engagement, 4–5. 
154 Zaidi, “Who Benefits from U.S. Aid to Pakistan?” 104–5. 
155 Khan, Eating Grass, 235.  
41 
USIP special report, these “punitive measures” damaged U.S.-Pakistani relations more 
than anything else.156  
This relationship further deteriorated during the Clinton administration as the 
United States pursued a relationship with India. The focus of U.S. foreign policy during 
the Clinton’s presidency was to expand the U.S. liberal world order by mending the 
relationships that had been negatively affected by the Cold War; in the context of South 
Asia, this meant that the United States sought to rekindle its relationship with India. Aparna 
Pande states that the Clinton administration did not want to choose between South Asian 
states, but, ultimately, it viewed India as the more useful partner going forward into the 
21st century.157 Clinton himself said that he wanted to build a long-lasting relationship 
with India because he believed that “with the Cold War over, [he finally] had the 
opportunity, as well as an obligation, to improve U.S.-India relations” as “the Cold War 
and clumsy diplomacy” unnecessarily kept India and the United States apart.158 In pursuit 
of this goal, Clinton visited India and addressed the Indian Parliament, where he “spoke of 
[his] respect for India’s democracy, diversity, and impressive strides in building a modern 
economy.”159 Stronger ties between the United States and India did not sit well with the 
Pakistani government, which viewed the relationship as having significant security 
implications.160 The growing Indo-U.S. relationship further soured Pakistan’s perceptions 
of the United States. 
Despite Pakistan’s nuclear development and U.S. desires to build a stronger 
relationship with India, Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban gave an opportunity for 
the Clinton administration to partner with Pakistan. According to an Al Jazeera article, the 
Clinton administration wanted to work with the Taliban to set up an oil and gas pipeline 
from Central to South Asia, including Afghanistan, after the breakup of the Soviet 
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Union.161 The article argues that the Taliban, which controlled the southern and eastern 
portions of Afghanistan and was supported by Pakistan, wanted the Union Oil Company 
of California (Unocal) to build the pipeline so it could receive the $400 million earnings to 
invest into the development of the country. The article concludes that the Clinton 
administration supported the pipeline and facilitated discussions between Unocal and the 
Taliban because his administration viewed the pipeline as critical to stabilizing 
Afghanistan.  
However, as the decade continued, although it initially had its benefits, the U.S. 
struggled to work with the Taliban due to its connections with Al Qaeda, and, therefore, its 
relationship with Pakistan, which protected the Taliban, deteriorated. Additionally, the 
United States felt that because of its 1999 military coup, Pakistan was failing to embrace 
the liberal world order. First, immediately following the end of the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan, the United States made efforts to buy back Stinger missiles that Pakistan 
helped provide to Afghan rebels. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had given these 
missiles to Afghan rebels to fight off Soviet aircraft in the 1980s and now wanted to prevent 
them from falling into the possession of terrorist groups or Iran.162 Coll suggests that, over 
time, the United States mistrusted Pakistan because the United States believed the Pakistani 
government was undermining American efforts to work with the Taliban to buy back these 
weapons.163 He writes that by the middle of the decade, 600 out of the 2,300 Stingers that 
the CIA distributed were still missing, and he adds that of those Stingers, Iran was in 
possession of 100, Afghan warlords who possessed them valued them more than most 
currencies, and by the fall of 1996, most of the remaining weapons were in Afghanistan, 
the government of which was now under the control of the Taliban.  
In addition to the Stinger weapons debacle, the United States was also disgruntled 
with Pakistan because it protected the Taliban even once it became apparent the group was 
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connected to Al Qaeda — the terrorist group responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center 
and the 1998 Africa embassy bombings. The explosive techniques, timing devices, and 
plastic explosives used by Ramzi Yousef in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were 
the same as those featured in the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) camps the CIA had funded 
and trained during the 1980s.164 Clinton recalls that some of the camps the Pakistani ISI 
used to train insurgents who fought in Kashmir were the “same camps that bin Laden and 
Al Qaeda [used] to train the Taliban.”165 According to Coll, the Taliban were aided by the 
ISI even while the Taliban were connected with Osama bin Laden through its association 
with Al Qaeda, which was responsible for the deaths of over 200 people in the 1998 United 
States embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.166  
As a result of these attacks, Clinton signed an executive order placing economic 
sanctions on the Taliban and froze their financial assets.167 Clinton also believed that 
cooperation between Washington and Islamabad was inconceivable, because if the 
Pakistani government ever found out about planned U.S. counterterrorism attacks in 
advance, “it was likely that [the ISI] would warn [either] the Taliban or even Al Qaeda.”168 
The sanctions exemplified the American government’s growing concern about the Taliban, 
which generated increasing tensions in U.S.-Pakistani relations. 
Second, the Clinton administration was also concerned that Pakistan was 
undermining democracy, which could undermine Clinton’s rhetoric of advertising the 
liberal world order in South Asia. Shenon writes that this concern justified the Clinton 
administration’s decision to issue a warning to Pakistan that it might be labeled by the 
administration as a state-sponsor of terrorism.169 Clinton states that even before General 
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Pervez Musharraf came to power in 1999, he believed that the “Pakistani military was full 
of Taliban and Al Qaeda sympathizers.”170 This concern contributed to his refusal to 
intervene in the Kargil conflict after Pakistani Prime Minister (PM) Nawaz Sharif 
specifically asked him to mediate with India to resolve the crisis.171 When Musharraf 
overthrew Sharif on October 12, 1999, Clinton was concerned about the loss of democracy 
in Pakistan and “urged the restoration of civilian rule as soon as possible.”172 
Just after the start of the new century, in 2001, U.S. foreign policy shifted to 
counterterrorism as the United States engaged in the GWOT after the terrorist attacks 
against the United States on September 11th. After the attacks, U.S. foreign policy shifted 
to counterterrorism under the presidency of George W. Bush (the second Bush 
administration). In his National Security Strategy that was released in 2002, Bush declared 
counterterrorism as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy moving forward into the 21st 
century.173 Unlike the containment strategy of the Cold War, the “Bush Doctrine” made it 
clear that the U.S. government considered states that did not assist the United States to be 
complicit with terrorist organizations.174 In his memoirs, President Clinton states that 
while his administration attempted to “work with Pakistan to defuse tensions on the Indian 
subcontinent,” Pakistan could not necessarily be trusted because it supported Al Qaeda by 
extension of its relationship with the Taliban.175 Now, just as U.S. foreign policy was 
shifting and the United States sought useful partnerships to combat Al Qaeda and to defeat 
extremism in the region, the United States viewed Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban 
as a critical resource. 
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B. RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE WAR ON TERRORISM
The United States actively sought useful and willing partners to join its
counterterrorism operations in the GWOT. As a result, the United States once again desired 
Pakistan’s assistance to fulfill U.S. strategic needs as it prepared to invade Afghanistan in 
October 2001. The United States deemed Pakistan an essential partner because the ISI had 
strong connections with terrorist groups and could therefore help the United States prevent 
extremists from going back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan’s insecure and 
heavily disputed border. Pakistan’s issues that had plagued the Clinton administration 
became advantageous in the United States’ GWOT strategy. Musharraf, who took control 
of the Pakistani government through a coup d’état in 1999, volunteered Pakistan as a 
frontline state in the U.S. war efforts. Despite Pakistan’s historical relationship with the 
Taliban, Musharraf saw forming an alliance with the United States as an opportunity to 
consolidate his power and receive necessary resources via a renewed relationship with the 
United States. 
1. Relationships between the Bush Administration and Pakistan
The experiences and the personalities of the second Bush administration played an 
important role in the resurrection of the U.S.-Pakistani relationship after the 9/11 
attacks. Unlike the Clinton administration, the Bush cabinet was very familiar and had 
personal connections with Pakistan due to several members’ previous government 
positions. Many of Bush’s closest advisors, including his vice president, secretary of 
state, and secretary of defense, had served in the presidential administrations of Richard 
Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and/or Bush’s father, George H. W. Bush, all of which had 
significant relationships with Pakistan. 
Dick Cheney, who served as vice president during the GWOT, was familiar with 
Pakistan as he served as chief of staff in the Ford administration and was a member of 
Congress during the Reagan years, when the United States authorized the sale of jet fighters 
and offered unprecedented amounts of economic aid to Pakistan due to the Soviet invasion 
45 
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of Afghanistan.176 Cheney saw the change in U.S.-Pakistani relations as he also served as 
secretary of defense in the first Bush administration, when U.S. sanctions ended the sale of 
those very same fighter jets and as U.S.-Pakistani relations began to deteriorate.  
During the Zia regime, Colin Powell was a U.S. army general serving as national 
security advisor in the Reagan administration and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
during the elder Bush’s presidency. The New York Times reported that Colin Powell, then–
secretary of state, spoke with Musharraf at least 81 times between the September 11th 
attacks and the spring 2004.177 This type of communication between the U.S. secretary of 
state and the Pakistani president was unprecedented given the previous relations between 
the United States and Pakistan during the 1990s. Weisman explains that Powell and 
Musharraf related because they were two former military officers, generals, who grew up 
in the same global environment.  
Lastly, the younger Bush administration’s secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld, 
had previously served in the same position in the Ford administration and served under 
Nixon during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.178 Rumsfeld, who was experienced in dealing 
with foreign leaders, particularly held Musharraf in high regard because Rumsfeld believed 
that Musharraf was a “generous host” who was confident and “forthright” in his 
conversations with U.S. officials.179 As the U.S. secretary of defense, Rumfeld’s 
confidence in Musharraf was essential in the U.S. decision to include Pakistan in the 
GWOT. 
2. Pakistan’s Geopolitical Significance in the GWOT 
The presence and experience of these individuals influenced the second Bush 
administration’s decision to look to Pakistan as a strategic partner. Pakistan’s strategic 
location by sea, air, and land helped sustain U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the GWOT 
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as Pakistan allowed the United States to use several of its ports, airspace, and military 
bases.180 In return for the United States using Pakistani military bases, then–secretary of 
defense Robert Gates states that Coalition Support Fund (CSF) payments were used to 
supply essential needs to 1,000,000 Pakistani troops and support 100 operations in 
northwest Pakistan.181 Secretary Gates also said these payments were used to “compensate 
Islamabad for coalition usage of Pakistani airfields and seaports.”182 
Although the least important warfighting domain in this conflict, Pakistan’s 
maritime domain was necessary to support U.S. military operations during the GWOT. 
According to then–secretary of state Donald Rumsfeld, “strike fighters from aircraft 
carriers – the USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson [were staged] off [Pakistan’s] 
coast.”183 These fighters were critical to crippling Taliban strongholds prior to the U.S.-
led coalition ground invasion. 
Pakistan’s proximity to Afghanistan was also essential for the U.S. to conduct drone 
strikes and air surveillance during both the Bush and Obama administrations. Prior to 
American military engagement in the region in 2001, Predator drones had been conducting 
surveillance on Afghanistan from bases in Uzbekistan.184 As the war progressed, not only 
did the United States use Pakistani bases to launch drones, but Musharraf also gave the 
United States permission to use Hellfire missile–equipped drones in certain tribal areas 
within Pakistan that threatened his power.185  
On the ground, the American military utilized Pakistan’s border region with 
Afghanistan to provide supply lines for U.S.-led coalition troops fighting extremists to 
prevent those extremists from seeking haven outside Afghanistan and to deny Pakistani 
sympathizers the ability to join the fight against coalition forces. By 2004, the United States 
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military had 20,300 troops along the border.186 Zaidi explains that the Pakistani military 
was also crucial to helping the United States achieve its objectives at the border, as the 
United States used the CSF to get the Pakistani military to support U.S. border 
campaigns.187 In the first year of the Obama presidency, the Pakistan Counter-Insurgency 
Fund and the Pakistan Counter-Insurgency Capability Fund were established to achieve 
similar objectives as the CSF, but with a heightened focus on combating displaced 
insurgents inside Pakistan.188  
3. Musharraf’s Support for the GWOT 
One of the main catalysts behind Pakistan’s contribution to the American war effort 
was Musharraf, who saw bandwagoning with the United States as an opportunity to 
consolidate his power after an anti-democratic coup in 1999. In return, Musharraf would 
receive guaranteed support and resources due to both countries’ common goal of resolving 
domestic issues in Pakistan by ridding the country of terrorist influence. In the months 
following the September 11th attacks, he told religious scholars at Aiwan-e-Sadr189 that 
he was committed to driving out extremism and that he vowed to resist the resurgence of 
terrorist groups, which had been banned from Pakistan.190  
Although Clinton was disappointed in Musharraf’s actions due his involvement in 
Kargil and for the military coup, which threatened stability in South Asia and democracy 
in Pakistan, respectively, Clinton later admitted that he was genuinely impressed by 
Musharraf’s brilliance and poise.191 In his memoir, Bush says that he, too, “admired 
[Musharraf due to his] decision to side with America after 9/11,”192 and Bush recognized 
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that Musharraf “took serious risks [by battling] Al Qaeda,” as tensions between the 
Pakistani government and Al Qaeda increased, the latter trying to assassinate Musharraf 
on at least four occasions.193 
Responding to imminent American military action in Afghanistan, Musharraf 
served as an American surrogate as he tried to persuade Afghanistan’s leader, Mullah 
Omar, to comply with President Bush’s October 7, 2001 deadline to turn over Osama bin 
Laden or face the consequences of U.S. military action.194 
To please the Americans, Musharraf made attempts to modernize and reform the 
ISI before the war started. Coll explains that two hours prior to the war’s beginning, 
Musharraf had forced the ISI chief to retire and had replaced him with Lieutenant General 
Ehsan ul-Haq, who Musharraf viewed was more loyal to the American cause than his 
predecessor.195 Although he refused to apprehend Pakistani citizens, at the start of the war, 
Ehsan ul-Haq agreed to turn over to the United States “all Arabs and other foreign radicals” 
who crossed the border into Afghanistan.196 USIP analyst Touqir Hussain states that by 
2005, Pakistan “launched thirty-eight major successful operations to flush out foreign 
terrorists.”197 
4. Pakistan’s Military Contribution to Fighting in the GWOT 
Under Musharraf’s leadership, the Pakistani military played a pivotal role in the 
GWOT by supporting the United States along Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan, by 
assisting in the maritime domain, and by providing the United States intelligence 
information on terrorist networks. Hussain details Pakistan’s cooperation with the United 
States in his USIP report. He quotes C. Christine Fair, who supports the importance of 
Pakistani cooperation by quoting U.S. government officials who acknowledge that 
“Pakistan has provided more support, captured more terrorists, and committed more 
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troops” than any other U.S. partner in the GWOT.198 In his memoirs, Musharraf wrote that 
the September 11th attacks provided his government the opportunity to “get rid of 
terrorism,” and he knew it would be in Pakistan’s best interest to support the United States 
as the “extremists were too well armed, and too numerous, for [Pakistan] to manage 
quietly.”199 In all areas, Pakistan committed its military resources, units, and troops to 
combat terrorism.  
To prevent extremists and terrorist sympathizers from joining the fight in 
Afghanistan, Pakistani troops deployed to the Afghan-Pakistani border to help U.S. forces. 
Prior to the GWOT, Pakistan had very few soldiers guarding this border as most of its 
military was concentrated along its border with India due to prior military conflicts and 
rising nuclear tensions.200 If guarded at all, the border had previously been protected by 
the weak paramilitary Frontier Corps force.201 To contribute to the GWOT, Pakistan risked 
weakening its position on its eastern front vis-à-vis India by deploying 140,000 troops 
along its border with Afghanistan.202 Musharraf insisted that Pakistan needed to take the 
lead in ensuring that terrorists and extremists were stopped from fleeing “into the loosely 
governed, tribal provinces of Pakistan.”203  
The Pakistani navy was the only navy in South Asia that participated in maritime 
operations in support of counterterrorism efforts.204 Coll writes that from 2002 to 2003, 
Pakistan’s navy “conducted patrols to prevent Al Qaeda members from escaping by 
sea.”205 The following year, the Pakistani Navy participated in the U.S.-led Coalition 
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Maritime Campaign Plan, a counter-terrorism operation in the Arabian sea.206 By 2006, 
Pakistan’s involvement in the GWOT was cemented when, for the first time, the Pakistani 
navy took command of the multinational Combined Task Force-150.207  
Finally, the intelligence provided by Pakistan helped prevent terrorists’ movement 
and crippled their network. According to Hussain, by 2005, all of the top Al Qaeda leaders 
were captured with the help of the Pakistani government.208 He states that Pakistan 
“arrested more than seven hundred terror suspects.”209 The Pakistani government 
continued to support the anti-terrorism efforts by passing legislation aimed to limit the 
activities of militant organizations. According to Hussain, these actions included the 
government’s decision to freeze “thirty-two bank accounts suspected of belonging to 
terrorist organizations.”210 He also explains that Pakistan became the first country to install 
a terrorist-interdiction program in various airports around the country. 
5. The United States Resumes Economic and Military Aid to Pakistan 
In return for Pakistan’s assistance, the United States began pouring financial 
resources into the country. Zaidi argues that much of the aid the United States gave Pakistan 
during the war came with little accountability or no strings attached.211 Coll describes that 
many U.S. assistance programs served as “legal bribery to Pakistan’s generals [so that] 
Musharraf and [his people] could use the cash for legitimate military purposes, or they 
could spread it as they wished.”212 He states that the aid money “did not buy love, but it 
did seem to purchase a certain level of cooperation and tolerance” from Pakistani 
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government and military officials — enough for them to support the American 
counterterrorism strategy.213 
At the onset of the war, Bush explained that his administration designated Pakistan 
a major non-NATO ally and therefore lifted economic sanctions that had been in place 
since his father’s administration.214 He worked with Congress to provide Pakistan with $3 
billion in economic aid, and his administration supported Pakistani goods and services by 
making them available in U.S. markets. Additionally, he claimed that his administration 
pushed Congress to appropriate funds to reimburse Pakistan for its operational and 
logistical support in the GWOT. According to Zaidi, the amount of aid given to Pakistan 
by the United States between 2002 and 2010 totaled $19 billion.215  
The balance of aid allocation during GWOT heavily benefited the Pakistani 
military. Zaidi shows that between 2002 to 2008, at least 75% of foreign aid money from 
the United States was “explicitly [allocated] for military purposes,” while 10% funded 
Pakistani development.216 In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) regions, 
where a majority of the counterterrorism operations occurred, only 1% of U.S. aid, out of 
the $5.8 billion, was allocated towards development.217 The most notable exception to the 
Pakistani military being the primary beneficiary of U.S. aid was in 2005, when the Bush 
administration gave Pakistan nearly $500 million in humanitarian aid relief after 73,000 
people died as the result of a 7.6-magnitude earthquake in northern Pakistan.218 
When the United States lifted economic sanctions in the wake of the GWOT, it also 
reapproved the sales of arms and military equipment to Pakistan that were suspended when 
the Pressler Amendment was invoked. Between 2002 and 2007, the United States approved 
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more than $9.7 billion worth of weapon sales to Pakistan to be used for military equipment 
necessary to engage in counterterrorism operations.219 In 2010, the United States passed a 
$2 billion military aid package that specifically allowed Pakistan to buy American weapons 
and equipment for four years, until the end of the Obama presidency.  
6. United States’ Growing Frustration with Pakistan and the Emerging 
GPC 
Despite the extensive cooperation between the United States and Pakistan during 
GWOT, at the same time, not all the cooperation went well; the United States grew 
frustrated with Pakistan over the course of the war, which fractured and complicated the 
relationship. The U.S.-Pakistani partnership deteriorated because the United States was 
concerned about the continuation of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Also, the United States 
felt that by using U.S. aid and by secretly supporting the Taliban and extremist groups, the 
Pakistani government prioritized its competition with India over U.S. strategic goals. 
Although the United States was frustrated, it looked past what it viewed as Pakistan’s 
negligence and continued providing it support and funding because the United States 
needed Pakistan as a partner in the GWOT.  
The first source of U.S. frustration in GWOT was the Pakistani government’s 
continuation of its nuclear program. When Bush became president-elect, Clinton told him 
in his turnover that in addition to Pakistan’s ties to the Taliban and Al Qaeda, he considered 
the nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan the world’s biggest security threat.220 The 
program’s continuation also led to China expanding its influence in Pakistan. In the 1990s, 
China had already proved itself as a loyal friend by aiding Pakistan financially and helping 
it go nuclear. The United States wanted to undermine China’s growing influence and 
relationship with Pakistan and, since the beginning of 2003, had accused the Musharraf 
regime of undermining U.S. strategy, specifically with regards to Pakistan’s nuclear 
program.221 Musharraf alleges he was embarrassed when, at a UN Summit, CIA Director 
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George Tenet pointed out that “Pakistan’s P-1 centrifuge was found [by] the IAEA.”222 In 
Tenet’s opinion, Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were caused by its obsession with India, 
which made it clear that the U.S. government could not rely on Musharraf to fulfill all his 
promises to engage in counterterrorism operations.  
Indeed, Pakistan prioritizing its strategic position in relation to India over the U.S. 
strategic goal of counterterrorism was the second source of U.S. frustration towards 
Pakistan. Specifically, the United States believed that Pakistan misused U.S. foreign aid 
because the resources were not used solely to enhance Pakistan’s counterterrorism 
capabilities. Moreover, the United States felt Pakistan was undermining U.S. strategic 
goals due to its close relationship with the Taliban and other extremist groups. 
The United States was displeased that Pakistan was using U.S. funding to minimize 
the threat from India rather than concentrating on GWOT. Until the beginning of the 
Obama administration in early 2009, the United States generally sent funds to Pakistan 
without setting expectations because it assumed the financial resources the U.S. was giving 
to Pakistan were primarily being used for U.S. counterterrorism priorities.223 Zaidi 
contends that, in actuality, as early as 2007, following a DOD review of U.S. military aid 
in Pakistan, the U.S. military did not see significant results compared to the amount of aid 
that the U.S. government sent Pakistan.224 He points out that the DOD therefore shifted its 
aid requirements to be exclusively contingent on supporting the Pakistani military’s 
counterinsurgency operations in FATA, a region that President Bush himself claimed was 
essential to U.S. counterinsurgency goals.225 President Bush recalls that this plan was 
ineffective because in FATA, and other tribal areas, the Pakistani military did not improve 
its counterterrorism capabilities because it “trained [primarily] to wage a conventional 
battle” against India, which was a higher priority for Pakistan.226 The India Times quoted 
Ronald Neumann, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005–2007, who stated that in 
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addition to its failure to meet U.S. counterterrorism training expectations, Pakistan misused 
U.S. aid by purchasing weapons that were to be used to fight India.227  
Also undermining U.S. strategy and thereby frustrating the United States was 
Pakistan’s decision to partner with the Taliban and other extremist groups, which likewise 
was motivated by Pakistan’s desire to balance India. Markey echoes the analysis of U.S. 
policymakers and Pakistan scholars who state that not only did the Pakistani government 
take “billions of dollars of U.S. aid” to compete with India, but it also actively undermined 
U.S. goals to combat terrorism by not pursing extremist groups.228 Aside from the 
historical relationship between the ISI and extremist groups, Markey argues that during 
GWOT, Pakistan undermined U.S. efforts against the Taliban and other extremist groups 
because Pakistan used these groups as strategic assets  to balance against India. Bush too 
bolsters this assertion, as he believes that Pakistan used the Taliban as “an insurance policy 
in case America abandoned Afghanistan and India tried to gain influence [in Afghanistan],” 
which would compromise Pakistan’s security by leaving hostile neighbors on both sides of 
its borders.229  
Pakistan’s leniency towards the Taliban during various periods of GWOT enabled 
its members to flee to Pakistan’s tribal regions, allowing sanctuary cities, such as Peshawar 
and Quetta, to grow by the end of 2006. Markey explains that these sanctuary cities 
contributed to an increase in insurgency within Pakistan.230 Bush reflects that even when 
the Pakistani government tried not to interfere and allowed border tribes to govern 
themselves to prevent the recruitment of Taliban operatives, the strategy failed: it created 
windows of opportunity that enabled the Taliban  to increase violence in Pakistan, causing 
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Pakistan to reduce its support for the U.S.-led coalition in effort to quell this violence, thus 
increasing tensions between the United States and Pakistan.231   
By the middle of 2008, the continuation of Pakistan’s nuclear program and its focus 
on India rather than counterterrorism frustrated President Bush. In retaliation, Bush 
violated Pakistan’s sovereignty by authorizing coalition military units to operate within 
Pakistani tribal areas without its permission. Bush writes that he used innovative ways to 
disrupt the Taliban in the tribal areas, including the use of Predator drones that were 
“capable of conducting video surveillance and firing laser-guided bombs.”232 Zaidi 
suggest that while these actions were publicly condemned by the Pakistani government, 
Pakistan “turned a blind eye” and allowed the United States to fight Pakistan’s battles so 
the Pakistani military did not have to do it themselves.233 
Although frustrated, the United States still sought new ways to support Pakistan so 
as not to lose its partner at the frontline. Rather than give aid to the Pakistani military, the 
United States increasingly shifted its approach to supporting Pakistani development 
projects, in hopes that they would stabilize the country and decrease support for extremists. 
The United States was also responding to civil critique coming out of Pakistan that the U.S. 
government supported military regimes.234 Zaidi shows that the Obama administration 
“changed the way it has thought about aid [and focused instead on] social [programs] in 
education, healthcare, infrastructure development, poverty alleviation, and the like.”235 He 
notes the first step was the passing of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 
which committed “$7.5 billion in non-military aid to Pakistan over a five-year period.”236 
This marked the clear beginning of a shift in the nature of U.S. aid, wherein a greater 
allocation of resources benefited Pakistan’s civilian sector. 
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7. The Impact of the GWOT on Pakistan 
Pakistan’s involvement in the GWOT did not come without cost for the country. 
Over the period of a decade, from the time GWOT commenced until 2011, more than 
21,000 civilians and 8,700 Pakistani troops were killed or wounded in an attempt to curb 
“the menace of terrorism.”237 More Pakistanis died fighting in the GWOT than any other 
American ally.238 Zaidi argues that Pakistan’s involvement in the war was also responsible 
for the assassination of Pakistan’s former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, who was killed 
by an Al Qaeda–affiliated group that opposed her return to Pakistani politics.239 According 
to the USIP, Pakistan knew “its strategic overextension in the region, especially its support 
for the Taliban and, by implication, Al Qaeda, was untenable” and it would need resources 
to contain these groups.240 There is no doubt that Pakistan experienced a backlash from 
Taliban and affiliated institutions for its efforts during the GWOT. At the same time, other 
pre-existing structural factors also played a role in creating instability in the country.  
C. DECLINING ECONOMY, NEW ALLIANCES, AND INSTABILITY IN 
PAKISTAN DURING THE UNIPOLAR WORLD 
Throughout the Cold War, during the unipolar system of power distribution, 
Pakistan dealt with economic, political, and security challenges that destabilized its 
regimes. These structural factors created Pakistan’s need for financial aid and resources 
that incentivized the country to continue to seek aid from great powers. Although Pakistan 
enjoyed a close partnership with the United States during the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, U.S.-Pakistani relations declined after the Soviets left in 1989 because the 
United States no longer needed Pakistan. GWOT produced an opportunity to reestablish 
that alliance.  
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1. Impact of Declining Foreign Aid on Economic Instability in Pakistan: 
1991 to 2001 
Two major considerations caused economic instability in Pakistan from the end of 
the Cold War until beginning of the GWOT: the halt of U.S. financial aid after the Soviet-
Afghan War and the Asian financial crisis. As a result of losing American aid, Pakistan 
searched for new sources of economic support. Agha shows that since the Pressler 
Amendment sanctions, Pakistan’s government had been unable to attract foreign or local 
investment.241  
One major source of economic instability, in addition to the provisions under the 
Pressler Amendment, were the sanctions Pakistan faced as a result of its first nuclear test 
on May 28, 1998 in Chagai Hills.242 In response to this test, the Clinton administration 
imposed additional sanctions on Pakistan. According to Hussain, Clinton invoked “the 
1994 Glenn Amendment, which authorized sanctions on nonnuclear weapon states that 
detonate nuclear explosions, and the Symington Amendment, which prohibits military and 
economic assistance to any country that [delivered or received] nuclear assistance.”243 
Even before this test, Zaidi says U.S. development assistance to Pakistan in 1998 was 1% 
of the $452 million Pakistan had received in 1989.244  
Throughout the 1990s, the negative impact of the lack of U.S. foreign aid on the 
country’s economy became apparent. Khanna states that, entering the 1990s, Pakistan’s 
per capita income was 20% higher than India’s.245 He adds that the average Pakistani was 
better fed and clothed than the average Indian, as only 11% of Pakistanis lived below the 
poverty line. After the 1993 Pressler Amendment sanctions, Pakistan saw its first signs of 
economic decline when its growth was below the regional average for the first time in over 
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fifteen years.246 He also states that throughout the 1990s, Pakistan became the region’s 
slowest-growing economy, and poverty significantly rose to 18%. 
Several countries did respond to Pakistan’s need at this time. In August 1990, Japan 
assisted Pakistan after its loss of U.S. aid.247 Pakistan also leveraged its nuclear program 
to gain support in the Middle East, specifically from Saudi Arabia, as Pakistan became the 
first majority Islamic country to successfully test a nuclear weapon.248 Although the 
Saudis supported Pakistan, Pakistan’s nuclear explosion test caused it to face “another 
serious balance of payments crisis” as a result of economic sanctions and rising 
international pressure, including from Japan and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).249  
Also, at this time, China showed its interest in Pakistan. In the absence of U.S. 
financial resources, China stepped in and provided Pakistan military assistance, which went 
toward producing Pakistan’s bomb. During the 1990s, while Pakistan prioritized its nuclear 
ambitions, China aided Pakistan with significant military equipment, becoming Pakistan’s 
leading arms supplier.250 Specifically, the Monterey (now Middlebury) Institute of 
International Studies reported that China provided “magnets for producing weapons-grade 
enriched uranium, a furnace for shaping the uranium into a nuclear bomb core, and high-
tech diagnostic equipment for nuclear weapons test.”251 A New York Times article 
suggests that Chinese scientists and technology were integral in the development of 
potentially seven to twelve nuclear bombs for Pakistan.252  
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The Asian financial crisis in the mid-1990s limited the ability of several of 
Pakistan’s economic and military supporters, including China and Japan, to continue 
providing aid and resources.253 According to Khanna, the crisis further impacted 
Pakistan’s economic conditions during the second half of the decade, when Pakistani 
“exports were stagnant at around $8 billion.”254 Ultimately, the combination of the loss of 
U.S. aid and the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s caused Pakistan to 
economically suffer and created Pakistan’s need to once again seek new alliances. 
2. Economic Impact on Political Instability in Pakistan: 1991–2001 
At the end of the 1990s, Pakistan’s declining economy, due to a lack of stable 
foreign aid, was making it weaker in comparison to India. Pakistan’s domestic economy 
alone was unable to stabilize the country, so it once again required foreign partners to help 
relieve the country from its own economic troubles. The approaches taken by Pakistan’s 
civilian leaders, which took over after Zia’s unexpected death in 1988, led to friction 
between itself and the dominant military institution, culminating in Musharraf’s coup 
against Nawaz Sharif’s democratically-elected government in 1999.255 Musharraf sought 
a relationship with the United States in order to stabilize the military coup by legitimizing 
the Musharraf regime, and to resolve Pakistan’s political instability by receiving economic 
resources.  
Pakistan’s military and civilian institutions blamed each other for the loss of U.S. 
foreign aid. Zaidi suggests that, just as during other points in its history, ambitions of both 
Pakistan’s civilian and military regimes have caused the country’s aid dependency, which 
continued to affect the government’s actions during this time. The initial U.S. sanctions 
under the Pressler Amendment, which began in October 1990, occurred as the civilian PM 
Nawaz Sharif came into power.256 Although the military used the Pressler Amendment as 
a means of blaming the civilian government with the loss of U.S. aid, scholars suggest that 
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the reason for aid suspension was that the United States no longer deemed Pakistan 
strategically significant to U.S. foreign policy goals.257 Additionally, as the previous 
chapter explains, the military regime prior to Sharif made Pakistan dependent on this U.S. 
aid, and the United States suspended, due to Pakistan’s nuclear development, a program 
that was controlled by the military.258 After the Pressler Amendment and Pakistan’s 
nuclear development program led the United States to suspend its aid to Pakistan, the 
civilian government took three approaches that led to further tensions between Pakistan’s 
military and civilian institutions: changing of domestic economic policies, soliciting 
further aid from the U.S. or other partners, and decreasing the amount of funding the 
Pakistani military received in the country’s national budget. 
The first approach the civilian government took was changing Pakistan’s domestic 
economic policies; however, this plan failed and increased tensions between Pakistan’s 
institutions. McCartney states that the stagnation Pakistan experienced during the 1990s 
was “linked to deflationary macroeconomic [policies] after the late 1980s,” specifically 
with regards to Pakistan’s “industry, banking, and public investment.”259 The military 
believed Pakistan’s weakened economy was self-inflicted by economic policy choices, and 
therefore deemed the civilian-led government unable to satisfactorily meet the needs of the 
country. For example, Ahmed shows that the civilian-led government’s mediocre energy 
policies, which focused on “resource destructive imported fossil fuels techniques,” resulted 
in an unsustainable energy situation in Pakistan, because they could not keep up as “energy 
demands increased.”260 Aftab argues that because the energy crisis has had a lasting impact 
and remains the “largest single drain on Pakistan’s economy,” there is some validity to the 
military’s claim that the civilian economic policies during the 1990s failed.261  
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The second approach the civilian government took was to attempt to regain U.S. 
aid or to obtain financial assistance from other partners. Due to the ineffectiveness of 
Pakistan’s economic policy, the government attempted to regain U.S. aid to meet the needs 
of its financial dependency; however, this approach also failed, and thus the military further 
viewed the civilian government as still more ineffective and blamed civilians for the 
decline in U.S.-Pakistani relations. PM Benazir Bhutto, daughter of the late-Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto and PM from 1988 to 1990 and again from 1993 to 1996, was unsuccessful at 
soliciting the U.S. aid that was necessary to alleviate Pakistan’s economic struggles. Khan 
argues that the younger Bhutto struggled because she had to balance appeasing Washington 
with maintaining “the strength of Pakistan’s nuclear program” to ensure the country’s 
security.262 He explains that because Bhutto and the military disliked each other, the 
Pakistani military portrayed her as incompetent due to her lack of success in soliciting 
further U.S. economic assistance.263 Because Bhutto’s government struggled to solicit aid 
from the United States, the following Sharif government’s solution was to continue this 
pattern of aid dependency by seeking foreign assistance from Asian partners. However, 
Pakistan’s approach to relying on Asian partners proved unsuccessful due to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. Just after it became apparent that Asia would no longer be a viable 
option, the United States placed further sanctions on Sharif’s government following 
Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear bomb testing.264  
As Pakistan’s debt rose and it became apparent that it would not be able to rely on 
foreign partners for economic aid, the third approach that the civilian government took was 
decreasing the amount of funding the military received and reallocating those funds to other 
portions of the budget. The Pakistani military viewed this option as an attempt by the 
civilians to curtail the military’s power and influence within the country. Civilian leaders 
first called for the reduction of defense spending in Pakistan’s budget in 1988, when Bhutto 
suggested to regional leaders that South Asian states focus less on military build-up and 
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more on development.265 Agha explains that the change in budget a decade later was not 
solely the decision of the civilian government; rather, the IMF and World Bank “forced the 
Pakistani [civilian] government to cap the defense budget so that more could be spent on 
development.”266 
The three approaches by the civilian government to resolve Pakistan’s economic 
troubles during the 1990s created tensions between civilian and military leaders, which led 
to political instability as the civilians eventually attempted to limit the power of Pakistan’s 
military institution. According to Khan, the civilian government, under Sharif, had already 
threated Pakistan’s military by ousting three successive army chiefs by the end of the 
1990s.267 He explains that Sharif’s attempt to remove Musharraf as chief of the army268 
(by diverting his plane inbound from Sri Lanka to any other country) was the tipping point 
and cause of the coup. As Musharraf successfully landed in Karachi, political instability 
developed as General Headquarters  issued instructions for the military to take over 
government administrative roles from the civilians and the army placed “key [civilian] 
leaders into custody.”269 After this, Musharraf seized power and began to reach out to the 
United States to resolve Pakistan’s domestic issues. 
Even under a military regime, Pakistan did not experience the benefits of U.S. 
foreign aid, and political instability reoccurred as Musharraf was forced into exile in 2008. 
Shah argues that the United States has supported the “Pakistani military’s frequent 
interventions in domestic politics” because it has had an interest in keeping Pakistan 
stable.270 He concludes that this has failed and that by no means could Pakistan’s military 
sufficiently meet U.S. counterterrorism expectations, the basis for why Pakistan received 
U.S. aid under Musharraf. Zaidi concludes that despite receiving U.S. aid, Pakistan did not 
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benefit as the aid did not relieve Pakistan’s instability issues.271 Farooq shows that because 
Pakistan did not benefit, despite the intentions of military regimes, under their leadership 
“internal security [has] weakened and the regimes repeatedly [have] led Pakistan into 
crises, imperiling in security and cohesion.”272 Therefore, despite the military’s rationale 
for the coup, Pakistan’s foreign aid dependency during the 1990s is more complex than 
simply being the fault of the civilian-led government.  
As Pakistan sought external support, Pakistan’s military institution blamed and 
accused the civilian leaders of being incapable of achieving sustainable economic, 
diplomatic, or even security assurances to address Pakistan’s instability concerns. Without 
these assurances, Pakistan’s civilian government was forced to reallocate its internal 
resources, which created friction between the civilian and military institutions. Ultimately, 
these tensions led to the 1999 coup and contributed to the political turmoil, and instability 
forced Pakistan’s military to use its credibility to guarantee financial aid and resource 
assurances and political legitimacy from great powers, specifically the United States. In 
the end, it became apparent that the military regime could not resolve Pakistan’s internal 
issues, even with U.S. aid, which led to Musharraf’s exile in 2008. 
3. Security Imperatives Caused by Economic and Political Instability 
Economic and political instability in Pakistan during the 1990s led to internal and 
external security imperatives for the country from 1991 to 2017. Internally, Pakistan faced 
security concerns due to insurgencies in Baluchistan, while externally, the rise of nuclear 
tensions in South Asia made the region inherently dangerous and led to further instability 
and created the need for great power partners.  
First, as a result of implementing internal development projects to satisfy its 
economic needs, the Pakistani government once again expanded its presence in the 
resource-rich region of Baluchistan and, as a consequence, reignited the Baluchi 
insurgency that sought rights to control their resources. Adeel Khan states that Baluchi 
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nationalists were “infuriated” when Musharraf announced “mega-development projects,” 
aimed to stimulate the economy, in Baluchistan — most notably, Gwadar Port.273 In 2002, 
according to Khan, an agreement was signed between the Pakistani and Chinese 
governments, without Baluchi representation, authorizing China to take the lead in building 
the port. As a result of the United States distancing itself from Pakistan during the 1990s, 
Pakistan became dependent on China. He continues that this agreement triggered fear of a 
government take-over amongst the Baluchi population, and, in retaliation, Baluchi 
nationalists attacked Chinese workers, causing Musharraf to respond militarily to quell the 
resistance. In addition, Khan explains that even without the Pakistani government actively 
expanding its influence in Baluchistan, due to ethnic reasons, the “Baloch always [have 
felt] more alienated when there is army rule because [the Baloch] have [never had] 
representation in the Punjabi-dominated army.”274 Domestic insurgency forced Musharraf 
to launch military action in Baluchistan in 2005 for the fifth time in the country’s 
history.275 The end result was the displacement of 84,000 people from their homes and the 
killing of Akbar Bugti, one of the “three nationalist leaders” whom Musharraf resented.276 
With such large domestic unrest, Pakistan relied on the partnerships with great power 
during the GWOT to not only successfully end the resistance, but to provide the requisite 
resources to deal with domestic post-conflict reconciliation. 
Secondly, the lack of U.S. economic aid and support during the 1990s forced 
Pakistan to complete its nuclear weapon development program, as a means to ensure its 
security against India. Feroz Khan argues that Pakistan’s obsession with building a nuclear 
bomb caused it to experience a security dilemma, therefore making Pakistan less stable and 
safe.277 Jaswant Singh, India’s then–defense minister, defended India’s nuclear bomb test 
on May 11, 1998, by arguing that the world was nuclearizing and that India felt threatened 
by Pakistan, which was aggressively trying to go nuclear with the help of another long-
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time India foe, China.278 This action sparked Pakistan’s response seventeen days later 
when it tested its nuclear weapon. These events made South Asia a nuclear region, and 
scholars began to question the implications the nuclear tests might have on deterrence 
theory, since both countries were historically prone to fighting one another.279 To help 
lower nuclear tensions in the region, Pakistan relied on great powers for diplomatic support 
to quell its fears of India. 
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
In the context of a unipolar system of power distribution, when Pakistan required 
external support, it ultimately still formed an alliance with the United States to balance 
India and to alleviate its economic, political, and security stability concerns. Likewise, 
when the United States needed Pakistan to achieve its strategic goals, it put aside its issues 
with Pakistan to seek a strategically situated partner that would be essential to the United 
States’ GWOT strategy of counterterrorism. There are three key takeaways from the 
dynamics between Pakistan and the United States within the context of the unipolar system.  
First, Pakistan has the military capability to effectively contribute to U.S. strategic 
goals, which makes it a desirable partner. Unlike in the Cold War, when the United States 
primarily needed Pakistan due to its location and influence amongst other groups (e.g., the 
mujahedeen), during the GWOT, the United States relied on Pakistan’s military to actively 
engage in conflict to defeat and limit the power of terrorists and extremists.  
Second, due to previous experience and distrust, Pakistan was willing to undermine 
its partnership with the United States if the Pakistani government perceived its actions 
maximized its own strategic goals; as the GWOT progressed, while the United States 
wanted Pakistan to drive out the Taliban, Pakistan only focused on Al Qaeda, which 
Pakistan viewed as the bigger threat. Additionally, Pakistan used many of the resources 
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given by the United States to prepare its army to fight conventionally (in response to India), 
rather than honing military training and doctrine to focus on counterterrorism efforts.  
Lastly, Pakistan searched for new partners in the absence of U.S. support. When 
the United States suspended aid, Pakistan received assistance from Saudi Arabia, Japan, 
and, most notably, China. After the return of U.S. aid due to the GWOT, China still 
provided Pakistan economic support. While almost all of U.S. aid benefited Pakistan’s 
military, Chinese aid differed in that it predominantly focused on development of Pakistan 
— a unique difference to be mindful of in the future. 
Pakistan’s ability to be an effective partner for great powers, its tendencies to 
undermine its partners to meet its own strategic needs, and its willingness to search for new 
powers all have implications for the new emerging competition between great powers. This 
is important as the world prepares for the multipolar system of power distribution with the 
resurgence of Russia and the rise of China — the dynamics of which are explored in the 
next chapter.  
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IV. PAKISTAN IN THE NEW ERA OF MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM 
OF POWER  
While the United States was engaged in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), 
Russia and China were able to expand and challenge the American-led world order, giving 
rise to the multipolar system of power distribution. Their geographical locations and 
competing interests allowed them to expand their influence throughout the South Asian 
region, leading to a deepening partnership with Pakistan. Their presence in South Asia 
threatens the United States’ longstanding influence in the region; therefore, the United States 
has sought to expand its relationship with India to balance out Russian and Chinese influence. 
The United States’ decision to reach out to India has adversely affected U.S.-Pakistani 
relations, placing Pakistan at the center of these great powers’ conflicting interests in South 
Asia.  
This chapter begins by describing the strategic goals of each great power to 
effectively compete in this new system of power distribution. Next, it describes Pakistan’s 
position in the strategic goals of each great power. Then the chapter examines the continuing 
instability in Pakistan, which, as in the past, causes its leadership to reach out to great powers 
for support and resources. Based on these considerations, this chapter concludes that in 
comparison to the bipolar and the unipolar systems of power distribution, Pakistan is less 
likely to give its full allegiance to the United States and more likely to balance with Russia 
and/or China unless the United States supplies it with the resources and support it requires to 
resolve its domestic and security issues. 
A. RESURGENCE OF RUSSIA AND THE RISE OF CHINA 
Russia’s and China’s strategic decisions to expand their influence threaten the United 
States’ current international system of order. Both countries consider South Asia a region 
vital to achieving their objectives and, thus, they expand and formalize their relations with 
Pakistan. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union often offered its assistance to India, but it 
remained estranged from Pakistan while the country was a U.S. ally, especially during the 
Soviet-Afghan War. Currently, Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has increasingly sought to 
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build a relationship with Pakistan. China, meanwhile, has been an ally of Pakistan since the 
1960s, but in the past decade it has expanded this relationship. In response to the rise of these 
powers and their new alignments, the United States “pivoted to Asia” in 2015, prioritizing 
its relationship with India in an effort to compete with the other two great powers.280  
1. Russia’s Strategic Goals in South Asia  
Currently, some experts argue that Russia intends to reemerge as a great power that 
challenges the United States’ hegemony. Russia’s resurgence is linked to its loss of power 
and influence after the Cold War, an increased feeling of inferiority to the West, and the 
sense that the United States’ liberal world order and the spread of democracy are encroaching 
on its sphere of influence,281 threating its interests. Russia views the United States as its 
primary foe and the great power that most threatens its ability to regain global prominence. 
Kofman states that Russia measures itself “against the United States [when] seeking 
recognition, attention, or pursuing a deal” with smaller states.282 He adds that since the end 
of the Cold War, Russia has struggled to accept its global standing because it believes its 
current status was “imposed [by the Western world] at a time of Russian weakness.”283  
Now, Russia feels confident in its ability to play a major role in the international 
community. Russia’s current strategy is to undermine the U.S.-led liberal world order.284 
Most recently, in March 2020, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that the 
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new multipolar environment is shifting to “East from West.”285 He stated that this shift has 
created the opportunity for Russia to regain global influence, as Western-led globalization is 
“losing its attractiveness and is no more viewed as a perfect model for all.”286 Therefore, 
Russia seeks to undermine U.S. influence abroad by promoting its conservative belief that 
states should retain more control over their sovereign rights, contradicting the view of the 
liberal world order.287 
To achieve its strategy, Russia has increased its focus on South Asia. With China’s 
economic investments in Pakistan and the United States’ strengthened partnership with 
Russia’s long-time ally India, Russia seeks to re-exert its influence in South Asia to compete 
in the multipolar world by expanding its relationships in the region.288 
2. China’s Strategic Goals in South Asia  
As with Russia, China’s emergence as a great power is based on its strategy of 
countering American unilateralism and the liberal world order. During the GWOT, China 
increased its economic and military presence globally while it relied on the United States to 
take the lead in combatting terrorism; China’s involvement remained low for fear that 
participation in the conflict would incite unrest among its Uighur population.289 At the same 
time, China used U.S. presence in Afghanistan to expand its trade routes through 
Afghanistan.290 
Currently, in nearly every political and economic category China is either leading or 
second only to the United States in the world; , a Brookings Institute report states that China 
has the world’s second largest economy, defense budget, and technology sector and leads the 
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world in population, importing energy, and carbon emissions.291 Based on this evidence, the 
report claims that China desires “the ability to project hard power [at a global level], in 
addition to the political and economic influence it can already wield” as the United States 
did in the unipolar world.292 According to Jones, under Xi Jinping, China today is “more 
assertive, more nationalist, and more ideological” in pursuing its desires to project power.293  
Xi Jinping’s announcement in 2013 of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 
illustrates China’s ambitions. The BRI, China’s grand strategy, is a series of global 
infrastructure projects designed to expand China’s economic, political, and military 
influence.294 The BRI is important for China because the initiative is at the center of Xi 
Jinping’s foreign policy, as it has opened up China to new markets and energy resources and 
provided numerous other benefits.295 Rolland explains that not only is the BRI a “proactive 
effort [by China] to shape [Asia, and the world,] in accordance with Beijing’s worldview and 
broader strategic objectives” but also that China uses the BRI to “persuade other countries 
of the legitimacy of [its] claim to leadership.”296 Analysts at the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) describe the project as a “vast collection of development and investment 
initiatives [that] significantly [expand] China’s economic and political influence.”297 They 
also explain that other global powers view the BRI as a way for China to expand its military 
presence overseas, raising the alarm in the United States and throughout Asia.  
South Asia is an important region for China as it seeks to achieve its strategic goals 
through the BRI. Singh explains that because South Asia sits “at the intersection point of the 
China-proposed Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” its 
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strategic location is important for China’s plans to expand its global presence beyond 
Asia.298 However, according to Singh, China’s increased maritime presence in the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR) has put it at odds with its longtime rival India, which has made 
countering China a mutual strategic goal between the United States and India.  
3. The United States’ Strategic Goals in South Asia  
The United States’ great power status dates back to the Cold War, during the bipolar 
and unipolar worlds of power distribution. According to the Brookings Institute, the United 
States leads the world in its economy, military strength, diplomatic network, and energy 
exports and maintains the world’s premier institutions in the fields of technology, research, 
and higher education.299 In the multipolar world of power distribution, the United States’ 
struggle is to maintain its current liberal world order and remain competitive despite the rise 
of revisionist powers, which seek to challenge its hegemony.  
In recognition of this development, at the end of 2017, the Trump administration 
released its National Security Strategy (NSS), which acknowledged that Russia and China 
are challenging “American power, influence, and interests, [in an attempt] to erode American 
security and prosperity.”300 The strategy states that both Russia and China “are determined 
to make [their] economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control 
information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”301 It therefore 
articulates that to compete in the multipolar world, the United States will “promote American 
prosperity” by strengthening the country’s economy, preserving peace through military 
strength, and expanding American influence to advance its interests and benefit humanity.302 
The United States considers South Asia to be an integral part of this security 
strategy, as South Asia contains a fifth of the world’s population, some of the world’s 
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fastest-growing economies, and nuclear powers and is a site of tensions that threaten global 
stability.303 The United States also remains concerned about the threat of terrorism and 
sees this region as a safe haven and stronghold for terrorist activities; indeed, nearly a fifth 
of all terrorist groups listed by the United States are based out of South Asia.304  
The NSS describes the United States’ whole-of-government approach to achieve 
its goals in the region, including political, economic, and military and security 
considerations. Politically, the American strategy is to strengthen its partnership with India, 
which has increased its “leadership role in Indian Ocean security,” and to press Pakistan to 
“intensify its counterterrorism efforts.”305 Economically, the strategy calls for the U.S. 
government to “promote prosperity and economic linkages that will bolster connectivity 
and trade” throughout South Asia.306 Militarily, the strategy states that the United States 
is committed to supporting the South Asian governments in combatting the terrorism that 
threatens enduring peace in the region. 
B. THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE 
WORLD’S GREAT POWERS 
Given these global powers’ plans to compete in South Asia, how is Pakistan 
currently situated in and affected by those plans? What is the current state of Pakistan’s 
relationship with the two emerging powers, Russia and China, and the former sole global 
hegemon, the United States? As this section explains, the answers are uncertain and 
complex. 
1. Current State of Russo-Pakistani Relations  
Historically, Russia’s relationship with India drove its decisions in South Asia. 
Moscow’s desire for a robust relationship with New Delhi was due to India’s rising 
international stature, brought about by its more assertive and engaged foreign policy under 
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Indira Gandhi.307 Currently, Moscow struggles to maintain a close partnership with New 
Delhi due to the rise of the Indo-U.S. friendship, driven in part by India’s concern about 
the rise of Chinese influence in South Asia.308  In order to balance expanding Indo-U.S. 
ties and regain its presence in South Asia, Russia now seeks to form a partnership with 
Pakistan. 
Since 2011, as U.S.-Pakistani relations have deteriorated due to the Osama bin 
Laden raid and other American concerns regarding Pakistan’s ability to control various 
Taliban sects that hide out in Pakistan, Russia has engaged in a partnership with Pakistan. 
Russia’s military capabilities have been the primary enabler of this partnership due to its 
relative economic weakness compared to the other great powers, which hinders its ability 
to significantly contribute to Pakistan’s economic development.309 Russia and Pakistan 
have thus forged a strong military partnership, such that Pakistan relies on Russia for 
military sales, training, and cooperation. 
In 2012, to strengthen the military relationship between the countries, Pakistan’s 
General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani became the first Pakistani army chief to visit Moscow.310 
Kayani’s trip was followed by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s trip to 
Pakistan.311 These talks contributed to Russia’s decision to lift its arms embargo on 
Pakistan and begin negotiations to sell Russian Mi-35 Hind attack helicopters to Pakistan 
two years later, in 2014.312 This move came at a time when India, then the world’s largest 
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buyer of arms, was becoming less reliant on Russian military supplies and buying more 
Western arms as part of its military modernization plans.313 Russian arms sales to Pakistan 
continued, and in August 2017, Pakistan purchased four Mi-35M variant attack 
helicopters.314 
Later that year, Russia and Pakistan signed a defense cooperation agreement, 
marking a “milestone” in the military partnership between the countries and setting the 
foundation of numerous joint Russian-Pakistani military exercises.315 Gady states that 
Russia and Pakistan held their first ever military exercise, Friendship, in September 2016, 
with over 200 participants from both militaries.316 He explains that not only did Pakistan 
gain from the experience, but because the training took place in a mountainous region, it is 
likely that Russia gained valuable counterinsurgency operations experience from the 
Pakistanis, who were active participants during the GWOT. The benefit to Russia of a 
partnership with Pakistan has thus extended beyond gaining influence in the region, and 
Russia continues to participate in the Friendship exercises.317  
Moreover, beginning in 2015, Russia and Pakistan’s military cooperation extended 
into the maritime domain. Both countries’ navies participated in the Arabian Monsoon, a 
counter-narcotics exercise in the North Arabian Sea.318 Two years later, the Russians, 
along with the other two great powers, participated in the 37-nation Pakistani AMAN naval 
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exercise.319 These exercises led to the signing of a naval cooperation agreement between 
Russian and Pakistan in the summer of 2018, when Pakistani vice admiral Kaleem Shaukat 
visited Russia to meet with the naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Vladimir Ianovich 
Korolev.320 This cooperation agreement coincided with the Russian military for the first 
time allowing Pakistani military officers to train in Russian institutions, deepening 
Russian-Pakistani military relations.321 
Although Russia is economically weaker compared to its military strength, it has 
still attempted to contribute to Pakistan’s economic development by establishing a free 
trade agreement and currency swap, intended to boost trade between the two countries, and 
by financing Pakistan’s trade and energy projects, such as the CASA-1000 project.322 
Russia has also offered economic assistance in other areas, including the Pakistan Steel 
Mills, the production capacity of which Russia has helped enhance.323 
Over the past decade, Russia and Pakistan have improved their relationship, which 
was nonexistent during the Cold War. While Russia has made economic commitments to 
Pakistan since 2011, the bulk of this relationship is based on defense cooperation. As U.S.-
Pakistani relations soured at the beginning of the decade, Pakistan has turned to Russia as 
a seller of arms. Throughout the decade, their militaries have been trying to become 
interoperable, evidenced not only by the number of joint military exercises but also by the 
consistency with which they have taken place.  
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2. Current State of Sino-Pakistani Relations 
China’s relationship with Pakistan is the most consistent and stable of all three great 
powers’.324 This relationship will likely remain consistent due to the shift of alliances in 
South Asia, specifically as the United States has grown a stronger partnership with India, 
leading China to take an adversarial posture towards India.325 China believes that with the 
weakening U.S.-Pakistani relationship and increased tensions with India, Pakistan will look 
to China as its primary great power partner.  
Since the 1990s, China has been involved in major infrastructural projects in 
Pakistan, including the construction of the Gwadar Port complex. According to CFR, as 
China has provided a majority of the labor and capital necessary to build the port, it gains 
“strategic access to the Persian Gulf,”326 which, the CFR explains, provides China’s 
Xinjiang Province, a landlocked and natural resource–rich region, access to the Arabian Sea. 
However, as of March 2020, a Bloomberg article concluded that the port has not lived up to 
its original expectations, as the airport is three years overdue and there are too few berths at 
the port to keep up with the heavy flow of traffic.327 
Nevertheless, China has proved to be a reliable provider of economic and military 
support to Pakistan over the course of their relationship. The most important manifestation 
of this support is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which includes numerous 
energy and infrastructure projects. CPEC, launched in August 2015, serves as the “flagship” 
program of China’s larger BRI goals. A report on Pakistan’s current global affairs, prepared 
by Pakistan’s Institute for Peace Studies, credits CPEC with helping “remove the impression 
that Pakistan has limited geo-economic choices except [for] the U.S.”328 When the program 
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was officially launched, its projects were worth $46 billion.329 After its initial investment, 
CPEC investment increased to $55 billion, and, by 2017, China had approved an additional 
$7 billion to bring the program’s total investment to $62 billion.330 According to Hillman, 
McCalpin, and Brock, as of April 2020, about 32 out of 122 of China’s CPEC projects have 
been completed.331 
One of CPEC’s most significant contributions to Pakistan’s economic development 
has been in the energy sector. A majority of China’s projects in Pakistan are energy sector 
related as opposed to industrialization projects.332 China’s commitment to Pakistan’s energy 
development dates back to 2010, when it announced that it would build two nuclear reactors 
in Pakistan.333 Since then, China has helped build more reactors in Pakistan, with the most 
recent scheduled to be completed by the end of 2020.334  
In addition to contributing to development projects, China continues to stimulate 
Pakistan’s economy via various trade agreements. The CFR report states that an initial 
comprehensive trade agreement, initiated in 2008, gave each country “unprecedented market 
access to the other” and increased trade between China and Pakistan by $8 billion in just two 
years.335 This agreement set the groundwork for the second phase of the China-Pakistan 
Free Trade Agreement, signed on December 1, 2019, which deepens trade and protects 
domestic industries in each country.336 
                                                 
329 Salman Siddiqui, “CPEC Investment Pushed from $55b to $62b,” Express Tribune, April 12, 
2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1381733/cpec-investment-pushed-55b-62b/.  
330 Siddiqui, “CPEC Investment Pushed.” 
331 Jonathan E. Hillman and Maesea McCalpin, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Five,” 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2, 2020, 1, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-
pakistan-economic-corridor-five. 
332 Hillman and McCalpin, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Five.” 
333 Afridi and Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations.” 
334 “China Completes Outer Dome on Overseas Hualong One Reactor in Pakistan,” Reuters, June 18, 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-nuclearpower-pakistan/china-completes-outer-dome-on-
overseas-hualong-one-reactor-in-pakistan-idUSKCN1TK047. 
335 Afridi and Bajoria, “China-Pakistan Relations.” 
336 Dorcas Wong, “China-Pakistan FTA Phase-II: Reduced Tariffs, New Safeguard Measures,” China 
Briefing, January 8, 2020, https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-pakistan-fta-phase-2-reduced-
tariffs-safeguard-measures-introduced/.  
80 
According to the CFR report,  the various sources of Chinese economic support to 
Pakistan are essential, as Pakistan “continues to face economic woes with falling foreign 
investment, a weakening currency, and an underperforming stock market.”337 The think tank 
asserts that China’s financial power, due to its large foreign-exchange reserves and ability to 
serve as a creditor, can help relieve Islamabad’s financial issues, specifically by fulfilling its 
need for cash to relieve its deepening balance-of-payment deficit. 
In addition to providing economic support to Pakistan, China also supports Pakistan’s 
military by selling it equipment and strengthening it through participation in joint military 
exercises. According to Afridi and Bajoria, many of the ballistic missiles in Pakistan’s 
arsenal are “modifications of Chinese imports.”338 They note that many Chinese parts are 
also used in some of the aircraft in Pakistan’s air force. Most notably, the two countries 
worked together to produce the JF-17 Thunder combat aircraft, the Block III variant of which 
made its maiden flight on December 15, 2019, and thereafter entered the Pakistani fleet.339 
As of late 2019, China has also mentored Pakistan to become an affordable arms exporter 
itself, servicing growing militaries such as Turkey and Myanmar.340  
Furthermore, China and Pakistan participate in joint military exercises. Like the 
Russians and Americans, China participated in Pakistan’s AMAN naval exercise in 2017.341 
In early 2019, Pakistan completed the Warrior-VI, a three-week special forces joint training 
with China focused on counterterrorism operations.342 As recently as January 2020, the 
states completed a joint naval exercise, focused on terrorism and crime. The level of 
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complexity of the exercises highlighted that they were more than just a symbol of 
friendship.343 
China’s relationship with Pakistan, however, does not come without concerns. China 
continues to struggle with extremism inside Pakistan that targets Chinese workers: in 2012, 
a Chinese woman was shot by the Pakistani Taliban in Peshawar; in 2013, a bomb in Karachi 
killed Chinese engineers; in 2017, two Chinese nationals were executed by the Islamic State; 
and in 2018, Pakistani separatist militants stormed the Chinese consulate in Karachi.344 
China is also concerned that Chinese Uighurs could use Pakistani tribal regions as a safe 
haven to radicalize, threatening China’s internal security.345 Pakistan seeks to address 
China’s fears by cooperating with the Chinese government and helping it prevent Uighurs 
from using Pakistan as a launchpad for potential attacks on the Chinese homeland. In 2009, 
Islamabad handed over nine Uighur militants to China who were operating in Pakistan.346  
These concerns, though, seem not to affect the prospect that Sino-Pakistani relations 
will continue to grow. Unlike other leaders in the international community, Pakistani Prime 
Minister (PM) Imran Khan has refused to criticize China for its treatment of the Uighur 
population.347 Pakistani ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani explains that 
Pakistan provides China “a low-cost secondary deterrent to India [while providing Pakistan] 
a high-value guarantor of security against India.”348 From China’s perspective, the closer 
India moves to the United States, the more willing China is to overlook its concerns with 
Pakistan. Not only does Pakistan’s location along the Arabian Sea provide China with a 
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western water outlet, but China also has interests in Kashmir due to its border: China has not 
directly engaged in conflict in Kashmir since 1962; however, a Pakistan Institute for Peace 
report suggests that China’s border agreement with Pakistan gives China “a direct stake in 
[resolving] the Kashmir dispute.”349  
Although Beijing has the capability of providing Pakistan with military support, the 
primary focus of Sino-Pakistani relations is economic development. Beijing has a vested 
economic interest in a stable and developed Pakistan, and it does not view Pakistan as critical 
to its military defense. 
3. Current State of U.S.-Pakistani Relations 
Due to the Trump administration’s increased pressure on Pakistan to engage in 
counterterrorism operations, and as the United States has become more critical of Pakistan’s 
tolerance of militant extremists, U.S.-Pakistani relations have grown more tense and distant. 
Likewise, the United States has prioritized its growing relationship with India to balance 
China. As a result of these tensions and shifting alliances, the United States has reduced 
military aid, training, and weapon sales and eliminated foreign aid to Pakistan; however, at 
times, it has still used Pakistan to achieve its strategic goals.  
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report explains that since 2011, the 
sentiment amongst U.S. lawmakers has been that Pakistan’s “intentions [and] capacity to be 
an effective partner” have weakened, thus initiating congressional inquiries into whether 
Pakistan should be a recipient of U.S. foreign aid appropriations.350 In the first eight months 
of his presidency, Donald Trump condemned Pakistan and said that the U.S. government 
could “no longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations, the 
Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.”351 The next year, the 
U.S. president took a tougher stance by threatening to “take further punitive action” if 
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Pakistan continued to fall short of taking decisive action against terrorism.352 In 2019, the 
U.S. director of intelligence, Dan Coats, testified before a U.S. Senate committee that 
Pakistan’s ties to militants remained problematic for the U.S. government, as Pakistan was 
not fully cooperating in counterterrorism operations with the United States.353  
Pakistan’s tolerance of militant extremists has led to a drastic reduction in U.S. 
foreign aid. After the 2017 NSS was released, the United States cut nearly $300 million in 
aid to Pakistan.354 In January 2018, the first $500 million of Coalition Support Fund (CSF) 
aid was cut.355 A few months later, in September, in response to a tweet by President Trump 
expressing his growing displeasure with Pakistan, the DOD redirected an additional $300 
million of CSF aid away from Pakistan.356 
Additionally, as was the case during the 1990s, the United States’ emergent 
relationship with India threatens Pakistan. According to a CRS report on U.S.-Indo relations, 
the relationship is built on the states’ similar democratic values, and United States values 
India’s “vibrant economy, pluralist society, and cultural influence, and growing military 
power.”357 Both countries are concerned with China, and each views the other as an essential 
partner to contest China’s rise.358 Therefore, many of the security guarantees the United 
States once gave Pakistan are now enjoyed by India. The United States has decreased arms 
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sales to Pakistan, whereas Bowman and Gabel report that, by 2019, U.S. arms sales to India 
reached their highest amount ever.359 Most recently, during a February 2020 trip to India, 
President Trump announced that his administration would sell India $3 billion worth of 
American-made arms.360 Although the United States and Pakistan still conduct joint military 
exercises,361 the exercises between the United States and India have become more robust 
than current U.S.-Pakistani exercises, creating the need for Pakistan to seek security 
assurances through other alliances and hindering U.S.-Pakistani relations.362  
Like the previous administration, the Trump administration has shown that it is 
prioritizing an alliance with India in South Asia to achieve its goals in the multipolar system 
of power distribution. Montague echoes this sentiment by quoting Daniel Kliman,363 who 
believes that the Trump administration is “less concerned about alienating Pakistan” than 
merely trying to work with it in GWOT.364 
Recently, however, the United States has softened its rhetoric towards Pakistan. Just 
two months after Coats’s Senate testimony, the United States became less critical towards 
Pakistan in response to President Trump’s request for Pakistan’s assistance in the 
Afghanistan peace talks.365 During the same February 2020 trip to India, President Trump 
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stated that the United States had a “very good” relationship with Pakistan and that his 
administration was “beginning to see signs of big progress” in U.S.-Pakistani relations, very 
likely as a way to show China that the United States has strong relationships with both India 
and Pakistan.366 These comments alarmed the Indian government and the crowd listening to 
President Trump’s speech, which led to further confusion about U.S. intentions regarding the 
formation of alliances in South Asia.367 
C. ISSUES CURRENTLY CONTRIBUTING TO INSTABILITY IN 
PAKISTAN 
Since the emergence of the unipolar world in 1991, Pakistan has been politically 
stable, as it has not experienced a military coup since 2008, when it became a democracy. 
However, Pakistan’s economic and security concerns continue to provide it imperatives to 
seek great power partners. Internally, Pakistan suffers from energy and other resource 
concerns, as well as from developmental issues, such as low education rates, unemployment, 
and underdeveloped infrastructure. Likewise, while domestic terrorist attacks have 
decreased, Pakistan still struggles to contain dissident ethnic groups linked to historical 
insurgencies. Externally, although there is reason to believe that on one side of its border, 
lasting peace can be achieved in Afghanistan, on the other side, tensions between Pakistan 
and India remain unchanged. Primarily, the provocative behavior of PM Narendra Modi and 
the rise of Hindu nationalism makes Pakistan feel further threatened by its perennial foe, and 
it continues to rely on great powers to balance India. Due to the United States’ shift toward 
India, Pakistan is increasingly driven to rely on China and Russia to obtain resources and 
support to address its stability concerns.  
1. Economic Stability: Sustainability and Development 
Economic instability in Pakistan is driven by its low economic growth, which has not 
kept pace with its population growth. The 2019 CRS report on U.S.-Pakistani relations 
describes Pakistan as still being “a poor country [that experiences] high rates of inflation and 
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unemployment” and that at times also experiences a shortage of resources.368 Pakistan’s 
economic state forces it to rely on great powers, which provide financial aid and foreign 
investment, for economic support. 
In particular, Pakistan’s economy constantly struggles with a balance-of-payments 
crisis, which Imran Khan inherited upon taking office as prime minister in July 2018.369 
From 2017 to 2018, Pakistan’s budget deficit increased 45%—from $12.4 to $18 billion.370 
Schwemlein points out that this raised alarms because it was Pakistan’s third balance-of-
payments crisis in the past decade.371 He states that although Pakistan wanted to reach out 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for support, the U.S. government stated that it 
would not endorse the use of IMF tax dollars for Pakistan due to its concerns over “China’s 
increasingly assertive behavior” in Pakistan.372 Nevertheless, the IMF gave Pakistan a $6 
billion loan (in addition to the $5.8 billion it already owed), its 13th loan in 30 years, in May 
2019, only after Pakistan had received loans from China and Middle Eastern partners.373 
The uncertainty of financial support from great powers and Pakistan’s continuous reliance 
on the IMF has created concerns in the international community over the instability of 
Pakistan’s economic situation.  
Pakistan’s 2018 rise in debt and economic crisis are due to problems related to its 
trade deficit; domestic economic policy; technology, employment, and education; and 
climate change. First of all, Pakistan’s trade deficit had risen from $2.7 billion in 2015 to 
$18.2 billion in 2018, a trend that continues to this day.374 Runde argues that the trade deficit 
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is a product of Pakistan’s high imports relative to its low exports, its overvalued exchange 
rate, and the country’s “loose” monetary policy, which has created an unusually high demand 
for domestic goods — contributing two-thirds of its economic growth.375 Meanwhile, 
Husain points to trade failures—in particular, its lack of intraregional trade—as the source 
of present economic struggle in Pakistan.376 Husain argues that because the Indian 
subcontinent is the world’s least integrated region, intraregional trade has decreased by 14% 
since before the partition of British India.377 Additionally, although Pakistan is an attractive 
market for the three great powers, a CRS report blames the Pakistani government’s current 
barriers to trade and investment for international companies’ limited ability to conduct 
business in Pakistan, thus preventing them from contributing to its economic 
development.378 
Secondly, Pakistan’s domestic economic policies have encouraged corruption and 
tax evasion, which have contributed to economic instability in Pakistan because they have 
deterred foreign investment. Weak tax policy has led Pakistan to have one of the lowest tax-
to-GDP ratios compared to other countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, whose taxes are on average 25% more of their total GDP than are 
Pakistan’s.379 Additionally, a CRS report on U.S.-Pakistani relations points to corruption as 
a “major obstacle” for Pakistan, as corruption has had a negative impact on foreign 
investment in the country, weakening its economic development.380  
Third, Pakistan struggles to embrace technology and to find effective ways to 
incorporate it into the country’s development. Husain states that this failure is caused by 
Pakistan’s lack of skilled labor, its ineffective education system, and its meager research and 
development and that these shortfall has constrained Pakistan from being economically 
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competitive in the current global environment.381 According to Husain, Pakistan’s poor 
education system results from its lack of “qualified and competent teachers” and a poor 
curriculum that is “outdated and has [minimal] linkages with industry,” causing technical 
and vocational training to be 9% lower than the global average.382 He states that this 
dynamic has led to a reduction in productive jobs in Pakistan, and he concludes that the lack 
of skilled workforce has constrained the use of technology in Pakistan, causing a disparity in 
“growth and human development” and economic instability in a technology-dominated 
world.383 
Finally, Pakistan’s increased energy needs, as it strives to develop, have further 
contributed to its economic instability. Husain explains that as Pakistan continues to develop, 
it will continuously seek more energy for its already large population compared to other 
states its size.384 He states that the electricity and energy consumed by Pakistanis will release 
more carbon emissions into the air, which will contribute to climate change — a challenge 
for Pakistan because it has an impact on sustainability in the realms of “agriculture, food 
production, and energy supplies,” all sectors associated with the rising quality of life 
Pakistani citizens desire.385  
Pakistan’s trade deficit; poor economic policies; failure to embrace technology due 
to a lack of an educated, skilled, and employed workforce; and inability to resolve issues 
caused by climate change have perpetuated its economic instability. In the multipolar system, 
continuing economic instability requires Pakistan to seek great power partners as it has done 
in the past to overcome its economic and development shortfalls. To that end, Pakistan joined 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which provided it an economic alliance with Russia, 
China, and other regional states.386 Unlike previous systems, which were characterized 
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primarily on bilateral agreements, in the multipolar system, Pakistan has engaged more 
heavily in multilateral cooperation to address its economic concerns.  
2. Internal and External Security Threats 
As in the bipolar and unipolar systems, Pakistan continues to suffer from internal and 
external security threats, which increase its need for great power partners. Internally, Pakistan 
has become more domestically stable due to the Taliban being treated by the international 
community as a legitimate political entity as this recognition has lessened its recourse to 
violent political expression within Pakistan. Akhtar makes the case that the decline of 
militant extremists may also be due to the Pakistani military becoming more effective in 
counterinsurgency operations, as evidenced by the decline of insurgency in Pakistan’s 
Federally Administrated Territories (FATA).387 Nevertheless, issues in Baluchistan have 
persisted. As of April 2019, Baluchistan’s northern belt, a region that is predominantly 
controlled by Pashtuns, still faces attacks on government security forces, and aspects of the 
region’s cultural identity have been banned.388 Violence in Baluchistan is not just limited to 
security forces, however, as exemplified by a suicide attack at a vegetable market in Quetta 
on April 12, 2019, that killed Pashtun civilians.389 
Externally, Pakistan appears to have moved past its concerns that Afghanistan poses 
a security threat.390 Goodson argues that Afghanistan will always inherently be threatening 
to Pakistan’s national interest.391 However, with the United States ending its combat 
operations in Afghanistan and as the U.S. government appears to have reached a sustainable 
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peace deal with the Taliban to bring the group into the Afghan political system, Pakistan is 
less fearful of its western neighbor.392  
India, however, still presents a threat to Pakistan because as it has started to play a 
larger role in the global stage, India continues to grow into a regional hegemon. Pakistan’s 
four primary tensions with India are India’s increasing regional economic power, rising 
Hindu nationalism, the Modi government’s recent actions in Kashmir and consequent 
military conflict between the two states in early 2019, and its threatening of Pakistan’s water 
supply as it competes for resources.  
India’s increased regional economic power is best exemplified by its membership in 
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), an organization comprising five of 
the world’s largest emerging markets. This membership helped India gain its membership 
into the Group of Twenty, an international forum that focuses on protecting and promoting 
global financial stability. India’s membership as the only South Asian state in these groups 
places it as an important decision-maker on the global economic stage and gives it more 
international connections, thus giving it more global influence than Pakistan. In an attempt 
to undermine India’s increased global stature, Pakistan “rejected a declaration by the BRICS” 
nations, after these nations claimed that Pakistan was a safe haven for terrorist groups.393  
Tensions between India and Pakistan are also rising; as Shamim argues, the Indian 
government “is using state structures against Muslims” as a method to “gain political and 
ideological legitimacy,” leading to Modi’s successful election in 2014.394 To consolidate his 
power, Modi has continued to push pro-Hindu rhetoric and to increase non-secular policies 
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that have deepened tensions between Indian Hindus and Muslims.395 Pakistan believes that 
the Modi government’s actions against Indian Muslims have led to greater Islamophobia in 
the region and that India’s aggressive and oppressive behavior could lead to an increase in 
violence toward all Muslims in South Asia.396 The internal conflict in India amongst its two 
largest religious groups has made Pakistani Muslims feel threatened and has contributed to 
Pakistan’s reliance on great powers to balance India.  
As India’s policies further infuriated Muslims in the region, Lalwani and Tallo 
explain that on February 14, 2019, a Pakistan-based Islamic jihadist military group, Jaish-e-
Mohammed, “killed 40 paramilitaries in Indian-administered Kashmir” when a suicide 
bomber drove a vehicle filled with explosives into a bus.397 With the national elections in 
less than a few months, the bombing forced Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP)398 
to respond forcibly.399 Therefore, Mir states, India launched airstrikes, and, on February 26, 
Pakistan further escalated tensions by shooting down “an Indian Air Force plane and 
[capturing] its pilot.”400 In retaliation, the BJP revoked the provisions of Kashmir’s Article 
370 and 35A.401 According to Shamim, the BJP made this decision in order to push its 
“Islamophobia manifesto” by bringing about “a demographic shift in Kashmir to create 
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Hindu majority.”402 He continues that by capitalizing on anti-Muslim sentiments in India, 
these actions proved successful for the BJP and led to the party’s landslide victory in the 
2019 elections. He concludes that the BJP has further used its election mandate to solidify 
Hindu nationalism and encourage attacks against Kashmiri Muslims. 
Another consequence of this conflict is that India has threatened Pakistan’s water 
supply. Pakistan’s water supply is already meager due to the impact of climate change.403 
India heightens this threat because as tensions have increased between the states, it has used 
actions against the water supply to retaliate to other unrelated scuffles. Johnson points to the 
February 2019 terrorist attack in Kashmir as yet as another reason why India has threatened 
Pakistan’s downstream water supply.404  He notes that an additional source of conflict 
creating security concerns between the perennial rivals, Pakistan and India, is the dam along 
the Ravi River. 
Pakistan’s security issues with India have the potential to lead into an all-out war, 
creating an unstable environment and intensifying its need for great powers to balance 
against India.  
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
Unlike during the bipolar system of power distribution, Pakistan does not solely rely 
on the United States in the multipolar world to resolve its issues of economic and security 
instability. As Russia reemerges and China rises, they have both increasingly aligned with 
Pakistan to help resolve its instability. In return, Pakistan’s relationship with these great 
powers has helped them achieve their strategic goals to compete in the current system of 
power distribution.  
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There are three major takeaways in the multipolar system. First, Pakistan has been 
less likely to give its full allegiance to an alliance with the United States to balance India and 
resolve its domestic instability issues, so as long as it can fill the gaps in the resources and 
support it receives from the United States with other willing great powers. In the absence of 
the United States, Pakistan has increasingly sought arms and military support from Russia, 
while China has provided financial support and has invested in the economic development 
of Pakistan. 
Second, although the United States favors a relationship with India in the multipolar 
system, it has still maintained a cordial relationship with Pakistan when it is strategically 
advantageous. The United States slashed aid and training to Pakistan near the beginning of 
the Trump administration, and then, just over a year later, it sought Pakistan’s help in 
resolving the Afghanistan peace process.  
Finally, the shift of U.S. alliances in South Asia, as the United States has strengthened 
relations with India, defines great power relations in South Asia today. The increased Indo-
U.S. relationship has put further strain on Sino-Indian relations, leading China to strengthen 
its partnership with Pakistan, and it has led Russia to rely less on India and more on Pakistan 
to balance the other great powers. 
As the United States continues to ally with India to compete for power, it has still 
shown interest in maintaining a relationship with Pakistan, as needed. How the United States 
forms relations is a consideration for other great powers, which will affect which power 
Pakistan decides to partner with and will define how it decides to balance the sources of its 
external instability. Based on these conclusions, the next chapter explains what can be 
expected of Pakistan’s relationship with great powers as the world continues in a system of 
multipolar power distribution. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research has sought to explain how Pakistan forms alliances with great powers 
during various systems of power distribution by examining how it is situated in the 
competition amongst great powers and by determining how Pakistan has leveraged great 
powers to address its stability concerns. To that end, this thesis has analyzed three phases 
of Pakistan’s relationship with great powers since its establishment in 1947: during the 
Cold War (bipolar system of power distribution), Global War on Terrorism (unipolar), and 
the emerging competition between great powers (multipolar). The investigation has 
revealed that Pakistan’s geographic significance, colonial ties, religious influence in the 
region, and strong military institution have driven great powers to incorporate Pakistan into 
their strategic goals. Additionally, it found that Pakistan uses its economic, political, and 
security concerns to attract foreign partners to help resolve its instability. These trends 
make it clear that Pakistan will continue to play a critical role in the emerging competition 
between Russia, China, and the United States. 
A multitude of factors have affected and will likely continue to affect how Pakistan 
will align with great powers in the developing multipolar competition. First, the research 
shows that in each system of power distribution, Pakistan has required partners that can 
provide it with both financial support and military resources. As Chapters II through IV 
observe, when Pakistan does not receive adequate support from its partners, it seeks out 
other partners that can fulfill its needs. Chapter IV explains that both China and the United 
States currently have the ability to do so, but, while Russia can provide Pakistan with the 
military support it requires, Russia’s relatively weak economy compared to those of the 
other great powers’ constrains it from being able to provide Pakistan with the economic 
support it requires.  
Second, while Chapter II shows that great powers have deemed South Asia a 
geographically strategic region since the start of the Cold War, Chapter III concludes that 
great powers could not align with both India and Pakistan due to the discord between them. 
Therefore, Pakistan is unlikely to form a serious partnership with any great power that it 
feels is undermining its security by forming a strong alliance with India. China is the only 
96 
great power that has always shared with Pakistan a distrust of India and has had no interest 
in forming a relationship with it.  
Third, although Pakistan has the ability to be a strong military partner for great 
powers, it is willing to undermine the strategic goals of its partners if it believes such 
actions can help meet its strategic objectives. This behavior has caused tensions with great 
powers: Chapters III and IV show that the United States grew disgruntled with Pakistan for 
this reason. Still, in the unipolar and the current multipolar world, there are signs that the 
United States intends to look past this perceived betrayal by Pakistan.    
A. FINDINGS 
Shifting partnerships between great powers and other South Asian states will very 
likely play a stronger role than in the past in determining alliances between great powers 
and Pakistan. These dynamics will also influence which power other powers are most 
concerned about in this developing multipolar system. Chapter IV explains that China 
deepened its relationship with Pakistan to compete with the United States, while Russia 
shifted its focus from India to Pakistan because it believes the United States to be its 
greatest threat. These reactions are unsurprising as these resurging and rising states wish 
to challenge U.S. global hegemony. The United States’ growing relationship with India 
suggests that China is its major concern, which has shifted the center of gravity in the 
emerging competition to Asia, whereas under the bipolar system, the United States’ 
greatest concern was control of Europe because of the threat of the Soviet Union (Russia). 
In this context, based on this research, Pakistan will likely not pick one country 
with which to align in the emerging competition between great powers. Instead, because 
Pakistan stands to benefit from its relationship with each great power, it will likely pursue 
relationships with all three great powers.  
Of the great powers, China is best positioned to forge the strongest partnership with 
Pakistan. Unlike in previous systems of power distribution, China can now offer Pakistan 
the economic support and military resources it desires. Also, China and Pakistan share a 
dislike of India, which makes them natural strategic partners; this may outweigh a 
relationship based on convenience, as is the case with Russia.  
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Accordingly, Pakistan is least likely to pursue a significant relationship with 
Russia; Pakistan and Russia historically, and recently, have not shared many mutual 
interests, and Russia still desires a relationship with India. Additionally, Russia is likely to 
remain the least able of the three great powers to meet Pakistan’s economic needs. Russo-
Pakistani relations have succeeded as much as they have only because Russia is a 
revisionist state that desires parity with the United States amidst the growing Indo-U.S. 
relationship.  
As for the United States, it does not need to worry about Pakistan’s growing 
relationship with other powers, or even the fact that China might be Pakistan’s preferred 
partner in the current global environment. The United States has been through this situation 
before—after 1965 and 1989, as Chapters II and III indicate—and each time has reclaimed 
a strong partnership with Pakistan, which has been in the strategic interest of both states. 
Pakistan is open to partnering with whatever state can give it resources, and its past 
behavior suggests that it might even be willing to undermine China if it can receive more 
or better resources from somewhere else. So long as the United States has the means and 
is willing to provide Pakistan with economic and security resources, the United States will 
be able to form a strategic partnership with Pakistan, despite its current relationship with 
Pakistan’s nemesis, India.  
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
FUTURE ENGAGEMENT 
The fact that Pakistan is one of the world’s few nuclear-powered states and has 
longstanding animosity with another nuclear-powered state (India) must not be ignored. 
The instability in Pakistan, and South Asia as a whole, places it at the forefront of concern 
for great powers affected by the potential for a catastrophic security threat should these 
trends continue. A worst-case scenario would be that extremist groups could benefit from 
the instability in Pakistan by gaining access to its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, it is in the 
interest of great power states to ensure the stability of Pakistan and the region.  
Also, based on his speech in India described at the end of Chapter IV, President 
Trump appears to be interested in maintaining a relationship with Pakistan as a means of 
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showing China that the United States is very much present in South Asia. Additionally, his 
remarks seemed to suggest that he is confident that he can leverage a strong relationship 
with both Pakistan and India. If the Trump administration and the United States are serious 
about strengthening this partnership with Pakistan, the United States should primarily 
consider two policies in the near term. First, unlike in the past when U.S. foreign aid 
benefited the military establishment in Pakistan, the United States should provide 
assistance to Pakistan that is allocated for economic development. Supporting development 
in Pakistan could alleviate some of its economic woes rather than bolstering the military 
institution that has contributed to Pakistan’s political instability. Stability in Pakistan is a 
good policy for the United States because it will make Pakistan a strong partner in the 
multipolar world and will reduce extremism in Pakistan, which has frustrated the United 
States since GWOT, thereby allowing the United States to move past GWOT and focus on 
expanding the liberal world order to compete with China and Russia.  
Second, the United States militarily should consider Pakistan as an Asian state in 
its strategic plans rather than as a Middle Eastern state. Currently, the Indo-Pacific region 
is defined by the United States as the area between the United States’ west coast and India’s 
eastern coast.405 It does not include India’s western coast on the Arabian Sea nor the 
western parts of the Indian Ocean, which makes Pakistan geographically distant from this 
region, despite its numerous interests in the Indo-Pacific.  
While its reasons for considering Pakistan part of the Middle East are 
understandable given the context of the unipolar world and Pakistan’s engagement in 
GWOT, given the current global environment, the U.S. Department of Defense should 
move Pakistan from U.S. Central Command to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. This will 
allow the Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to take Pakistan into consideration 
when making strategic regional decisions regarding India and China, without having to 
coordinate with another combatant commander. Other U.S. agencies, particularly the State 
                                                 
405 “USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, accessed May 4, 2020, 
https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/. 
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Department, should also make this change to ensure there is a whole-of-government 
approach to partner or coordinate with Pakistan in the context of the developing GPC. 
It is true that there are costs and will likely be protest to this recommendation. 
Currently, as part of the area of responsibility of U.S. Central Command, Pakistan, as the 
region’s largest Islamic country, plays an integral role in the United States’ strategy 
combating terrorism and its operations in the Middle East. It is an important state in this 
region, and U.S. Central Command leaders are unlikely to let Pakistan go without 
opposition. Nevertheless, the recommendation should be considered given that the center 
of gravity in the new system of GPC is Asia, and that Pakistan, a nuclear-power state, 
nemesis of India, historic partner with China, and new ally of Russia, also plays an 
increasingly important role in South Asian regional politics, especially as the Global War 
on Terror continues to decline and come to an end.  
C. LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research found that Pakistan has used its instability to gain great power 
partners; however, since Pakistan has been politically stable in recent times, the next step 
should be to investigate whether Pakistan is actually on track to becoming more stable in 
the long term or if Pakistan will likely continue to use instability as a means of obtaining 
great powers’ support, which might affect how great powers approach Pakistan as a 
strategic partner. With this in mind, further research could also examine what strategies 
great powers can use to obtain a stronger relationship with Pakistan. Also, given that 
Pakistan will attempt to pursue relationships with all three great powers, will the various 
great power states accommodate Pakistan’s desire? Or, how close can Pakistan get to one 
great power without alienating another? 
Additionally, although this research has argued that the United States could pursue 
a relationship with Pakistan, the question remains whether or not the United States should 
take this section or if it should instead focus on its relationship with India.  
Finally, given that Asia is the center of the multipolar system, further research 
should examine which other countries play a significant role in the developing GPC 
between Russia, China, and the United States. 
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D. PARTING REMARKS 
Skeptics should not fear the potential for a decline of United States influence in 
Pakistan. According to the Brookings Institute, “The U.S.-led system of alliances 
encompasses 15 of the top 20 militaries in the world” and even during difficult times in the 
past and current U.S. presidential administrations, “it is not yet broken and still constitutes 
a weighty fact in international affairs.”406 The Institute further argues that when it comes 
to the “network of bilateral alliances in Asia,” the United States just “lacks an effective 
operational structure.”407 Even in the presence of global crises, such as the current 
COVID-19 situation, traditional international structures associated with the West, such as 
the IMF and the World Bank, have come to Pakistan’s assistance: on April 16, 2020, the 
IMF announced its Executive Board had approved of $1.386 billion dollars to address 
Pakistan’s COVID-19 pandemic. Also, the following day, the India Times reported that the 
United States provided Pakistan with $8 million in aid for the same reason.408 Therefore, 
there are signs that the United States might already be placing itself in a position to rekindle 
its relationship with Pakistan. However, even if this relationship fails to reach its previous 
prominence, the United States still has a strong foothold in South Asia to compete with 
Russia and China because of its growing relationship with India. However, because the 
United States has this relationship on which to rely, it will need to be attentive to the other 
great powers’ relationships with Pakistan if it is going to compete effectively. 
                                                 
406 Jones, “China and the Return,” 4. 
407 Jones, 4. 
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